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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Essays in the Economics of Education
by
Sam Ming Young
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
University of California, San Diego, 2017
Professor Julian Betts, Co-Chair
Professor Julie Cullen, Co-Chair
This dissertation consists of three papers on the economics of education. All
pertain to the notion of higher- or lower-achieving schools, in some way.
Chapter 1 estimates the magnitude by which the achievement level of a student’s
high school affects college admissions once students make the decision to apply. Using
administrative data from the University of California, I find a significant negative asso-
ciation between a school’s overall achievement level and the probability of admission
at 5 out of 8 UC campuses between 2001–2006, including 5 of the 6 most selective.
The average magnitude across all UC campuses is about -0.8 percentage points for a
xiii
one-decile increase in school-average achievement.
Chapter 2 uses lottery data from San Diego Unified School District to study
the long-term effects of school choice on students’ postsecondary outcomes. This
paper contributes to the school choice literature by being among the first to focus on
postsecondary enrollment and graduation, rather than nearer-term outcomes such as
standardized test scores in the immediate years following the lottery. Despite large
effects on what secondary schools students attend, we find mostly insignificant effects on
postsecondary enrollment and graduation outcomes from winning a school choice lottery.
Chapter 3 examines the sensitivity of school value-added estimates to the method-
ology used. Education scholars frequently use “value-added” models to assess schools’
effectiveness. Yet there are many variations of the model that scholars sometimes use,
which may affect corresponding results. Using a menu of three model classes and three
control specifications each — for a total of 9 specifications — we find a relatively modest
sensitivity to the control specification, and a somewhat greater sensitivity to the class of
value-added model. Precision appears sensitive to the inclusion of school-level controls
and whether researchers use panel instrument techniques to address dynamic panel bias.
We also observe a moderate positive correlation between value-added estimates and
schools’ average levels of test scores.
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Chapter 1
Do Colleges Favor Students from
Lower-Achieving High Schools?
Evidence from the University of
California
1.1 Introduction
In addition to race and socioeconomic status, the high school that a student attends
is another important dimension of an advantaged versus disadvantaged past. Coursework,
peers, and overall resources vary across schools, giving rise to vastly different experiences
between students of different secondary schools. Many of these differences can be
systematically approximated using a school’s overall level of achievement. Generally
speaking, the higher a school’s average level of achievement, the more resources and
advantages it typically offers.
In light of this, it is possible that colleges may incorporate the overall achievement
or “quality” of a student’s school into their admissions decisions. Many colleges, for
instance, value equity or diversity along a variety of dimensions, and may wish to increase
the share of students from disadvantaged schools. School quality may also help put
students’ past achievements into context, thereby conveying additional information about
1
2student ability.
Whether driven by diversity or other reasons, examples can be found in which
school quality directly enters into admissions. For instance, section 51.805 of the Texas
Education Code lists 18 factors that determine admissions for students who do not
otherwise gain automatic admission. These include “the financial status of the applicant’s
school district” and “the performance level of the applicant’s school.” Similarly, colleges
in the University of California system follow a set of 14 admissions criteria designed
to evaluate students relative to their life circumstances. Coming from a “disadvantaged
social or educational environment” is listed among various personal background factors
taken into account. To help achieve this goal, at least two UC campuses used (and
displayed on their websites) admissions rubrics giving explicit bonuses to students from
lower-achieving schools.
Moreover, these bonuses occur even net of the admissions consideration of class
rank — which is otherwise often discussed as a way in which the high school affects
admissions. Outside of class rank, there has been little academic attention paid to the
direct use of school quality in admissions, and little is known about its magnitude. This
paper attempts to help fill this gap.
Using administrative data from the University of California, I estimate the admis-
sion rules of UC colleges between 2001 and 2006, paying particular attention to how a
school’s average achievement level affects admission probability net of all other observed
information. This analysis is done from a partial equilibrium perspective, focusing on the
admissions stage itself, after students have already completed high school and submitted
their applications. Absent any barriers to identification, the effect of interest answers
“How much more or less likely is an otherwise-identical applicant (ex post) to be admitted
when coming from a higher-achieving school?”1
1To clarify, ‘ex post’ means the comparison of interest is between students who are identical after
3The administrative data allow me to control for many essential determinants
of college admissions, including high school GPA, SAT scores, intended major, and
socioeconomic status. However, these data ultimately make up only a subset of the
information observed during actual admissions. A general threat to identification is that,
among the remaining items that are observed during admissions but not in the data, there
may be other factors that vary systematically with school quality. Effects of these factors
may be incorrectly attributed to school quality, resulting in biased parameter estimates.
Taking results at face value, I find school quality to be negatively associated with
probability of admission at five out of eight UC campuses between 2001 and 2006 while
controlling for other factors — including status within the UC’s system-level percent
plan. Aggregating across campuses, the average association is about -0.8 percentage
points for a one-decile increase in high school achievement, or roughly equivalent to a
0.04 decrease in high school GPA. The estimated marginal effect appears to be somewhat
larger at the lowest-achieving schools. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that
this admissions practice increases the share of attending students from below the median
high school by 14 percent (from 24.7 to 28.2 percent), while decreasing the share from
above the median high school by 5 percent.
Taking results at face value, I find school quality to be negatively associated with
probability of admission at five out of eight UC campuses between 2001 and 2006 while
controlling for other factors — including status within the UC’s system-level percent
plan. Aggregating across campuses, the average association is about −0.8 percentage
points for a one-decile increase in high school achievement, or roughly equivalent to a
0.04 decrease in high school GPA. The estimated marginal effect appears to be somewhat
larger at the lowest-achieving schools. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that
having gone through high school, and who both decided to apply to a given college. Except for their
high school, these students look identical from a college’s perspective. These students may not have been
identical ‘ex ante,’ or before entering high school.
4this admissions practice increases the share of attending students from below the median
high school by 14 percent (from 24.7 to 28.2 percent), while decreasing the share from
above the median high school by 5 percent.
Acknowledging the possibility of omitted variables bias, these results provide
an initial estimate, or a starting point, for an effect that has had little past benchmark
for its magnitude. This magnitude matters from a policy perspective, since it ultimately
affects students’ access to postsecondary education. Any effects on either the extensive or
intensive margin of college attendance may have long-term impacts on students’ earnings
and other life outcomes.2 Admissions practices may also affect students’ incentives
for which high schools to attend, with both partial and general equilibrium impacts
on students.3 While these latter topics fall outside the scope of the current piece, they
provide reasons to study the topic at hand and gain a more complete understanding of
how high schools affect postsecondary education access.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 reviews background and
related literature. Section 1.3 provides a conceptual and empirical framework. Section
3.4 describes the administrative data used. Section 3.5 presents empirical results. Section
1.6 concludes and offers additional discussion.
2The evidence on returns to college brand name or selectivity is slightly mixed, but more commonly
indicates an effect than no effect. Brewer, Eide and Ehrenberg (1999), Behrman, Rosenzweig and Taubman
(1996), Hoekstra (2009), and Black and Smith (2006) are among the papers that find significant effects,
while Dale and Krueger (2002; 2011) have two notable exceptions that find no significant effect.
3Evidence from Texas suggests that its top 10% policy — in which students ranking in the top 10%
of their class are guaranteed admission to any state university — induced some students to attend lower-
achieving schools (Cullen, Long and Reback, 2013; Cortes and Friedson, 2014). This behavior may have
mixed impacts on other students. Students who “trade down” may provide a positive peer externality on
raw achievement, but may also confer a negative class rank externality by displacing incumbent students
from the top 10%.
51.2 Background and Related Literature
In the broadest sense, this paper fits within the overall study of steps colleges
take to increase access for students from disadvantaged groups. Such efforts have been
common in the U.S. since at least the 1960s, and in recent decades have expanded to
include a widening set of personal background factors. This can be partly seen in Long
(2007). Beginning in the 1990s, several states began moving away from (and even
banning) traditional race-based affirmative action at public universities. Subsequently,
many of these states began considering a broader set of contextual factors, such as family
income, the high school setting, and other aspects of hardship.
On the role of the high school, there currently exist two segments of the literature
that explore how high schools affect access to postsecondary education. Each of these
literatures, however, approaches the issue of access from a slightly different angle than
the current piece. As such, neither literature is entirely parallel, nor provides definitive
answers to the key question of this paper.
In one literature, a handful of papers examine the relationship between a high
school’s overall achievement and college attendance. From this group of studies, there is
evidence that attending a higher-achieving school increases rates of college attendance
(Deming et al., 2014; Berkowitz and Hoekstra, 2011), and even the selectivity of the
college attended (Berkowitz and Hoekstra, 2011). These analyses, however, are generally
interested in ex ante effects — comparing students who are identical before entering high
school. Intermediate effects of the high school upon other aspects of a student’s record —
including the decision of whether to apply to college — are thus included as part of the
overall effect. So even as these studies have found beneficial effects from attending a
higher-achieving school, it is difficult to disentangle how colleges themselves respond
to school quality (once students apply) from the effects of these other intermediate
6outcomes.
A second literature focuses on how a school’s achievement affects admissions
via class rank. To the extent that peer achievement matters greatly for class rank, it
is sometimes argued that class rank preferences implicitly favor students from lower-
achieving schools.4 Such arguments are often raised in the context of percent plans, in
which students ranking in the top x% of their high school class are guaranteed admission
to at least one state university.5
By construction, these plans offer at least one form of access to students from
disadvantaged schools. However, in practice they may have only limited reach. An
important point is that their net effects depend on how students inside the top x% fare
without the percent plan in place. In the case of Texas, where the percent threshold occurs
at the top 10%, students within the top 10% had already been admitted with near certainty
prior to the percent plan (Tienda et al., 2003), even to flagship campuses. Conditional on
applying, admission outcomes typically remained unchanged for students inside these
plans’ direct reach.6
With this being the case, there is no obvious reason why school quality cannot
enter more directly into the admissions process. In fact, both the Texas Education Code
and the University of California’s list of admissions criteria indicate that this sometimes
4The influence of peer achievement on class rank is sometimes called the “frog pond” effect. Espen-
shade, Hale and Chung (2005) study this phenomenon in the context of college admissions. There is also
evidence from lotteries that attending a higher-achieving school may lower class rank. See, for example,
Cullen, Jacob and Levitt (2006).
5Percent plans began in the late 1990s, with Texas, Florida, and California being the most prominent
states with such a plan in place. Most academic studies of these plans have looked at Texas, where the
percent plan applies at individual campuses. This, however, is often not the case in other settings. It is thus
somewhat unclear how the results from Texas generalize to other settings.
6It is still possible that the policy may have affected access by inducing changes to application behavior.
The total number of applicant-sending high schools increased after the top 10% policy (Long, Saenz
and Tienda, 2010), and top 10% students appeared to focus their applications more heavily toward their
preferred campuses (Long, Saenz and Tienda, 2010; Long and Tienda, 2010). These channels, however,
are considered “general equilibrium” from the perspective of the current piece, which focuses only on the
admissions stage, and takes applicant behavior as given.
7occurs even in the presence of a percent plan. What remains missing is that there has
been little formal study of this more direct usage. Thus, the overall ways in which high
schools affect access to colleges are not fully understood.
1.2.1 UC-Specific Background
For the University of California specifically, Figures 1.1 and 1.2 provide some
additional insights.
Figure 1.1 shows a list of 14 admissions criteria that all UC campuses use
(University of California, 2012), with the aim of evaluating students’ merits relative to
the context of their life circumstances. Most relevant for this paper are items 5, 7, and 13,
which involve students’ high schools.
Item 5 pertains to Eligibility in the Local Context (ELC), or the UC’s system-
level percent plan. Beginning with the Fall 2001 entering cohort, originally students
ranking in the top 4% of their high school class were guaranteed admission to at least one
UC campus, though not a campus of the student’s choosing.7 Compared to Texas, the
guaranteed admission is considerably weaker, as it does not apply to individual campuses.
Nevertheless, it offers one form of access in a way that takes the high school into account.
Even with ELC, however, items 7 and 13 hint at further consideration of students’
high schools. Item 7 calls for students’ academic performance to be evaluated (at least
in part) relative to the peers at their school, while item 13 lists a “disadvantaged social
or educational environment” as a specific hardship for UC colleges to take into account.
Item 13 in particular hints that there may be a direct bonus associated with attending a
lower-achieving school, ceteris paribus. At least two examples can be found in which
this was the case; for many years during the 2000s, both UC Davis and UC San Diego
7The eventual campus of admission is not required to be among those to which students originally
applied. In this way, students cannot functionally select the campus of admission by only applying to their
preferred campus.
8published detailed admission rubrics on their websites, indicating such a bonus.
UC San Diego’s rubric is displayed in Figure 1.2.8 Up through Fall 2011 admis-
sions, UC San Diego used this formula to score students on an overall level of quality,
taking into account both individual achievement and background/contextual factors.9
Applicants whose overall score exceeded some threshold were subsequently offered
admission.
Looking at the formula, bonuses can be seen for various forms of hardship or
disadvantage. These include socioeconomic factors, such as low family income or being
in the first generation to attend college, but also (separately) the achievement level of
a student’s school. Within step II, one sees a bonus of 300 points — worth 300 points
of combined SAT score or 0.3 points of high school GPA — given to students from the
bottom 40% of California public high schools. Furthermore, this bonus was not mutually
exclusive from the consideration of ELC. While ELC status did not guarantee admission
(to the specific campus), ELC received its own bonus that was also worth 300 points.
1.3 Conceptual and Empirical Framework
Using the UC San Diego example as motivation, consider a stylized model of
college admissions. Suppose that, at a given college, students are rated on an overall
level of desirability (A∗i ) based on the contents of their application. Applicants whose
desirability exceeds some cutoff c are then offered admission. This can be represented
8The particular screenshots displayed were retrieved July 2, 2015 using an archived version of UC San
Diego’s admissions website. The source URL is http://web.archive.org/web/20041205230635/http://
admissions.ucsd.edu/dev3/info/comreview.html.
9UC Davis’ formula was similar, but with slightly different numbers. In recent years, many UC
campuses have begun switching to a system of ‘holistic review,’ which no longer uses a set formula, but
similarly tries to combine the many aspects of a student’s application into a single review score.
9with the following system:
A∗i = βQi + x
′
1iγ1 + x
′
2iγ2 + ui (1.1)
Admiti = 1{A∗i > c} (1.2)
where i is an index for students who applied, Qi denotes the average achievement level
or “quality” of a student’s high school, x1 and x2 denote all other items contained in the
application, and ui denotes an idiosyncratic error, perhaps from the specific admissions
officers assigned to each student. Let x1 contain items of the application that are also
available to the researcher (in a dataset), and x2 contain the remaining items that are
missing from the data.
β represents the consideration given to school quality, on the margin, as its own
piece of information. Holding fixed all other aspects of the application, β is the degree to
which a students is viewed more or less favorably when coming from a slightly higher-
achieving school. The goal of this paper is to estimate βˆ and its corresponding average
marginal effect on admission probability across a set of institutions.
For the case where ui is normally distributed with unit variance, a student’s
probability of admission, conditional on applying, is Φ(βQi + x′1iγ1 + x
′
2iγ2). With
access to the same information used in admissions, β, γ1, and γ2 can be consistently
estimated using a probit regression, recovering the complete admissions rule. The fact
that students sort nonrandomly to high schools does not otherwise prevent identification.
In practice, a challenge arises from the fact that datasets are typically incomplete.
That is, they do not contain all items observed during admissions. Some aspects of the
application, such as the transcript or personal statements, have many nuances that are
difficult to fully capture. When only a portion of this information is available, a practical
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version of Equation 1.1 can be written as
A∗i = βQi + x
′
1iγ1 + ηi, (1.1
′)
where ηi = x′2iγ2 +ui makes up a composite error term from the researcher’s perspective.
When the researcher now estimates
P (Admiti = 1) = Φ(βQi + x
′
1iγ1), (1.3)
βˆ and its corresponding marginal effect may be biased in either direction from the truth,
depending on what items are in x2 and how they correlate with Q and x1. Omitted
variables bias is thus a principal threat to identification.
The next section gives a more specific sense of the degree to which omitted
variables are a concern, describing the administrative data and what variables are present
versus missing.
1.4 Data
This paper uses administrative data on freshman undergraduate applicants to the
University of California between 2001 and 2006. The data are gathered by the UC Office
of the President (UCOP), which maintains a master database of all applicants to the UC
system. In total, 460,704 students appear during these years applying to eight different
UC campuses.10
The dataset includes individual-level data on students’ UC applications and
admission outcomes, high school GPA, SAT scores, ELC status, race, and parental
income and education. In addition, there is also a summary measure of achievement
10Overall there are nine UC campuses with undergraduates. The current analysis omits UC Merced,
which had only two admission cohorts during this time frame (Fall 2005 and 2006).
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for the high school attended, known as the Academic Performance Index (API). This
measure is recorded at decile level in the data, with the highest-achieving schools making
up the 10th decile. API decile is subsequently used as the value of Qi when estimating
Equation 1.3.
Prior to decile conversion, API is originally computed using each school’s average
performance on state standardized tests.11 Specifically, each year a school’s average test
scores are mapped to a numeric value between 200 and 1000. These values are computed
annually by the California Department of Education, and within California are often used
to describe school-level achievement. API is not computed for private or out-of-state
schools, due to the measure’s origin from the California Public Schools Accountability
Act of 1999. Moreover, students from those schools may also face a different set of
admissions criteria. To keep things cohesive, all subsequent analysis restricts attention to
the 320,721 applicants (about 70% of the total) from California public high schools.
Table 3.1 summarizes the data for this group of students, with additional informa-
tion in Tables A2 and A3 of the appendix.
A few key patterns can be seen across API deciles. First, the vast majority
of applicants come from the state’s higher-achieving schools.12 About 41 percent of
applicants come from API deciles 9–10, or the top 20% of public high schools. Only
10 percent of applicants come from the bottom two API deciles, with an additional 13
percent from deciles 3–4. Overall, this translates to an average API decile of about 7.0
among applicants, and between 6.6 and 7.4 at each campus.
Second, API decile shows a pronounced positive correlation with socioeconomic
11Until 2014, API used results of the Standardized Testing and Reporting (STAR) Program and the
California High School Exit Exam. STAR was then replaced by a different testing program, though that
does not affect the admission years in this paper. For high school students, STAR covered English-language
arts, mathematics, history, and science. Additional details about API can be found in California Department
California Department of Education (2012).
12This can be seen visually in a histogram in Figure 1.3.
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status. Whether looking at race, parental income, or parental education, applicants from
higher API deciles tend to come from more advantaged backgrounds.
Third, students’ past academic achievements vary systematically between API
deciles. Students from higher API deciles have higher average SAT scores and (to a
lesser extent) high school GPA, while also taking more Advanced Placement courses on
average. Yet the students from lower API deciles are somewhat more positively selected
from within their schools. Looking at the rates of ELC eligibility, about 30 percent of
applicants from the lowest-achieving schools (API deciles 1–2) rank within the top 4%
of their class, compared to 12 percent from the highest-achieving schools.
Having summarized the dataset as a whole, it is worth noting a few limitations
about the UCOP data. While the dataset contains many of the most essential determinants
of admissions, there are undoubtedly many additional items in students’ applications
that are not present. For instance, there is no information about personal statements,
extracurricular achievements, the exact transcript, or class rank (other than ELC status).
Admission effects stemming from these items cannot be directly controlled during
estimation, and become possible sources of omitted variables bias.
Another limitation is that, aside from API decile, no additional information is
provided about students’ high schools. School name and location are not stated, nor are
schools given unique identifiers. (These and other steps have been taken to guard student
anonymity.) This prevents school fixed effects from being used during estimation, and
also prevents instrumenting for API decile, since most instruments require knowledge
about location.
A final limitation is that, for anonymity purposes, some variables are blurred from
their exact values and are instead reported within a bin range. The most notable of these
are high school GPA and SAT scores. Much of this issue can ultimately be resolved using
an additional measure of student achievement, known as the Index score. Section A.1.1
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of the appendix discusses this measure in more detail.
1.5 Results
Tables 1.2–1.4 show the marginal effects from estimating Equation 1.3 using
various specifications. Before presenting these results, I note that standard errors may
be somewhat understated in these tables, due to an inability to cluster error terms at the
desired level.13 Appendix A.1.2 discusses this issue in more detail, and computes the
degree of within-cluster error correlation needed to make results insignificant.
Table 1.2 shows results with varying sets of controls. The top panel shows results
with all campuses pooled, while the bottom panel shows the estimated marginal effect
of API decile at each campus. For brevity, I primarily comment on the pooled marginal
effect estimate, but these patterns are also roughly true at individual campuses.
Pooled, the estimated marginal effect appears as large as −0.021 when only
controlling for the most essential student achievement measures and year. That is,
attending a higher-achieving school by one decile associates with a 2.1 percentage point
decrease in admission probability in column 1. Additional academic controls other than
ELC (column 2) do not affect this estimate by much.
Column 3 next adds controls for race, parental income, and parental education
— all of which are strongly correlated with API decile, but also bring many advan-
tages/disadvantages of their own.14 By all indications, UC colleges actively take these
contextual factors into account. Once controlling for these demographics, the estimated
marginal effect of API decile shrinks noticeably to −0.013, but remains significant.
13Intuitively, error terms should be grouped at the high school level due to various similarities in
experience between students of the same school. This clustering cannot currently be achieved, since
individual high schools are not indicated in the data.
14Under California Proposition 209, race cannot be explicitly considered during UC admissions. How-
ever, race is ultimately included in these regressions since it may affect other aspects of a student’s
experience that do enter into admissions.
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Column 4 adds dummies for whether students applied to each specific UC campus,
and the mean SAT score of attending students among applied campuses. Borrowing
somewhat from Dale and Krueger (2002; 2011), students’ decisions about which colleges
to apply to contain important information about their overall quality — in many cases
incorporating information from items in x2 (e.g. extracurriculars) that colleges see but are
not in the data. These additional variables help control for otherwise-unobserved aspects
of student quality. While these variables themselves are usually significant, suggesting
they do convey additional information about students, the average marginal effect for
API decile remains mostly unchanged at −0.012.
Finally, column 5 adds Eligibility in the Local Context, or a dummy for ranking
within the top 4% of one’s high school class. This guarantees eligible students admission
to at least one UC campus, but not a campus of their choosing.
While ELC is not legally binding for individual campuses, most UC campuses
still appear to respond to ELC status. Across all campuses, ELC is associated with an 11
percentage point increase in admission probability, on average, even after controlling for
various other measures of achievement. This has important implications on access for
students from lower-achieving schools. Since many applicants from lower API deciles
are ELC eligible (up to 30 percent from the lowest-achieving schools), the consideration
toward ELC also provides a degree of access to students from these schools. Yet this
does not appear to be a complete substitute for more direct use of school quality. After
controlling for ELC in column 5 of Table 1.2, the marginal effect of API decile shrinks
considerably at some campuses, and by about a third in the pooled case compared to
column 4. But the pooled marginal effect remains significantly negative, suggesting some
additional direct consideration. The final pooled estimate of −0.8 percentage points is,
on average, equivalent to about a 3.5 point decrease in Index score, or a 0.04 decrease in
high school GPA.
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Turning attention to individual campuses, Table 1.3 shows results for each campus
using the full set of controls. In this table and others, campuses are ordered by average
SAT score among attending students, so that campuses with similar selectivity appear
adjacent to one another.
Campus-specific marginal effects range from +0.002 to −0.024, and are signifi-
cantly negative at five out of eight campuses — including five of the six most selective.
While the estimated marginal effect is nominally positive and significant at the remaining
three campuses (Irvine, Santa Cruz, and Riverside), it is worth noting that none of these
campuses has an estimated marginal effect of more than +0.002, or 0.2 percentage points.
Moreover, analysis of standard errors (see Appendix A.1.2) suggests that the positive
significance disappears at these campuses under corrected standard errors clustered by
high school. Magnitudes are much more pronounced at the five campuses where the
marginal effect appears negative.
1.5.1 Nonlinearity Across API Deciles
Table 1.3 reports the average marginal effect at each campus as a single parameter.
Yet it is possible that the marginal effect is nonlinear across API deciles. For instance,
some campuses may view the difference between a 2nd and 3rd decile school (e.g.) to be
more or less meaningful than the difference between a 9th and 10th decile school.
To allow for nonlinearity, I also estimate each admissions rule using a specification
that includes each API decile individually. These results are displayed in Table 1.4. For
all campuses, the 7th API decile (roughly the average among applicants) is omitted as a
baseline. Table cells report associated differences relative to the 7th API decile, while
marginal effects of a one-decile change in API can be computed by comparing adjacent
estimates.
The main patterns from this specification can be seen in Figure 1.4. The marginal
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change in admission probability appears to be nonlinear and generally largest at lower-
achieving high schools. While the exact marginal effect varies from decile to decile, and
across campuses, results that include API decile using a spline function (see Table A5)
indicate that the average marginal effect is generally around −1.5 percentage points in
the bottom half of the API distribution, and fairly close to zero in the upper half.
Compared to a counterfactual where all students are treated as coming from the
7th API decile (roughly the average among applicants at each campus), these results
suggest that, for an average UC campus, school quality can contribute up to a 7.5
percentage point increase in admission probability for students from the lowest-achieving
schools. Relative to those students’ counterfactual probability of admission (41.1%
across all campuses), this represents an 18 percent proportional increase.15
For students from the highest-achieving schools, meanwhile, the decrease in their
admission probability appears to be about 0.6 percentage points (or less) at an average
campus. This translates to about a 1 percent proportional decrease, relative to those
students’ counterfactual probability of admission.16 Thus, whether measured by raw or
proportional change, the admissions use of school quality seems to affect students in the
lower API deciles much more than students in the upper API deciles.
1.5.2 Enrollment Composition
Using these results, it is possible to construct back-of-the-envelope estimates
of how the (apparent) use of school quality affects the resulting pool of admitted and
attending students. These results are displayed in Tables 1.5 and 1.6.
Table 1.5 first shows the actual, predicted, and counterfactual composition of
admitted students by API decile. In all cases, the predicted probability of admission is the
15Here, the counterfactual probability of admission is computed supposing all admission rules are as
estimated in Table 1.4, but that all students are evaluated as coming from the 7th API decile.
16Computing counterfactual admission probability the same way as before, these students have a
counterfactual probability of admission of 53.2% across all campuses to which they apply.
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probability implied by the regression in Table 1.4, while the counterfactual probability is
computed supposing that all admission rules are as estimated in Table 1.4, but that all
students are treated as coming from the 7th API decile.17 This generates a predicted and
counterfactual probability of admission for each student at each campus to which he/she
applies. Summing these probabilities within each API decile and within each campus
gives the predicted and counterfactual compositions displayed in Table 1.5.
For enrollment composition, I next combine a student’s probability of admission
with the probability of enrollment conditional on admission, at a given campus, to
estimate the overall probability that each student enrolls. Mathematically,
Eˆ(Enrolli) = Pˆ (Admiti = 1) · Pˆ (Enrolli = 1|Admiti = 1), (1.4)
with the counterfactual version replacing Pˆ (Admiti = 1) with Pˆ (Admiti = 1)counter =
Φ(x′1iγˆ1). To obtain Pˆ (Enrolli = 1|Admiti = 1), I estimate a probit regression of
enrollment among the admitted students at each campus, using the same explanatory
variables as when modeling admissions in Table 1.4. These conditional enrollment
patterns are then assumed true of all applicants to that campus, including those who were
not admitted.18 Summing the resulting values of Eˆ(Enrolli = 1) within each API decile
and within each campus gives the predicted and counterfactual compositions displayed
in Table 1.6.
Looking at the numbers in Tables 1.5 and 1.6, one sees that the predicted admis-
sion and enrollment shares (Panel B) generally come quite close to matching their actual
17To be precise, the counterfactual probability of admission replaces each student’s API decile with 7
and re-computes the probability of admission given by the probit function. Mathematically, Pˆ (Admiti =
1)counter = Φ(x
′
1iγˆ1), where the estimated effect due to API decile has been nullified. Depending on
students’ proximity to the admission margin, this may affect some students’ admission probability more
than others, even within the same API decile and campus.
18Table A6 displays the results of these conditional enrollment or “yield” equations. The yield equations
can only be estimated on the pool of admitted students, since the researcher never observes whether
students who were not admitted would have enrolled if given the chance.
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compositions. The most common error is that the model sometimes overestimates the
share of attending or admitted students from the very top API deciles. Correspondingly,
comparisons between the actual and counterfactual shares in Tables 1.5 and 1.6 may
somewhat overstate the impact on students in the upper API deciles.
Looking first at the shares of admits, between 2001 and 2006, about 27.0 percent
of admits came from API deciles 1–5, or high schools below the California median.
Under the constructed counterfactual, this share may have been only 25.0 percent if
not for the admissions consideration given to school quality. At least according to this
exercise, this admissions practice increases the share of admits from API deciles 1–5 by
about 8 percent (25.0 to 27.0 percent), while decreasing the share of admits from deciles
6–10 by about 3 percent (75.0 to 73.0 percent). As with the estimated marginal effects
earlier, the biggest gains (in a proportional sense) appear to accrue at the lowest API
deciles. While only about 8.6 percent of admits came from the API deciles 1–2, this is
about a 13 percent gain over the estimated counterfactual of 7.6 percent.
Once factoring in students’ predicted probability of enrollment, the effects de-
scribed earlier become somewhat more pronounced among students who ultimately
attend. According to Table 1.6, about 28.2 percent of attending students between 2001
and 2006 came from the API deciles 1–5. This is about 14 percent higher than the
estimated counterfactual of 24.7 percent. For students from the very lowest-achieving
schools (API deciles 1–2), the proportional increase is about 26 percent (7.0 to 8.8
percent). Meanwhile, the decrease in the share of attending students from API deciles
6–10 is about 5 percent (75.3 to 71.8 percent).
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1.5.3 Possible Explanations: Academic Ability Versus Other
Factors
Preferences for students from lower-achieving high schools, ceteris paribus, may
be driven by either academic or non-academic reasons. On one hand, many colleges have
preferences for a diverse student body. But school quality may also convey additional
information about students’ ability, (e.g.) by helping to put students’ past achievement
into context.
Using college performance measures from the UCOP data, it may be possible to
test which of these explanations has more empirical support. If the admissions behavior is
driven primarily by academic considerations, one generally expects to see school quality
predict college GPA in the same direction as its admissions use. To see whether this is
the case, Table 1.7 regresses students’ cumulative college GPA on API decile and other
observables from the admissions equation.19
The top panel shows results using ordinary least squares (OLS). Here, although
API decile is often a negative predictor of admission probability, it positively predicts
college GPA at each campus. This is consistent with a number of other studies of how
high school characteristics predict college grades.20
However, selection may play an important role in these OLS results. College
GPA, at a given campus, is only observed for students who ultimately enroll — itself a
subset of students who are first admitted. College GPA results obtained on this subsample
may not be true of the original pool of applicants. Making matters worse, the ways
in which students are admitted and enroll may itself create correlations between API
19I use cumulative college GPA, rather than first-year GPA, in case the influence of high schools upon
college performance weakens over time. However, results using first-year college GPA are very similar to
those in Table 1.7. Results using bachelor’s degree completion as the outcome are included in the appendix.
20Some examples include Betts and Morell (1999), Black et al. (2015), and Rothstein (2004). These
papers often do not include a school’s overall achievement directly as a regressor, but their results are
broadly consistent with a positive relationship.
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decile and unobservables, among enrollees, even if no such correlation existed among all
applicants.21
To try to correct for selection, panels B and C estimate the college GPA equation
using a Heckman (1979) correction. The two panels differ in how they model the selection
equation. Panel B uses no exclusion restrictions, relying only the nonlinearity of the
inverse Mills ratio for identification, while panel C uses admission offers to other UC
campuses as selection shifters.
Results in panel B offer somewhat less evidence of API decile being a positive
predictor of college GPA, with significance disappearing at four campuses, and the pooled
coefficient decreasing by about 60 percent compared to OLS. Yet no campuses show
API decile to be a negative predictor of college GPA. Results in panel C, meanwhile, are
mostly similar to those obtained using OLS.
These Heckman (1979) specifications have their own challenges to contend
with, and ultimately may not fully account for selection.22 However, all three of the
current specifications suggest API decile to be either a neutral or positive predictor
of college GPA, ceteris paribus. At least in this sense, it appears the consideration
given to school quality during admissions may be motivated more by non-academic
considerations. Increasing campus diversity is one possible explanation, though it is
21Cushing and McGarvey (2004) consider the case where students must be above some quality threshold
to gain admission, but only students below some other quality threshold enroll. This may arise if students
apply to many colleges, with differing selectivity, and then enroll at the “best” college to which they are
admitted. In such a setting, enrolling students who are positively selected on a particular trait are generally
negatively selected on unobservables, and vice versa. The end result is that coefficients in OLS regressions
of college GPA will be biased in the opposite direction from their true sign, or “toward zero.”
Such a result may apply here, as the general setup of Cushing and McGarvey (2004) appears broadly true
for UC colleges. Once students are admitted, nearly all traits that positively predict admissions negatively
predict enrollment, and vice versa. Students with higher predicted probabilities of admission generally
have lower (conditional) rates of enrollment.
22In the first case (no exclusion restrictions), the inverse Mills ratio remains close to a linear combination
of other observables. Identification is often tenuous in such cases (Puhani, 2000). In the second case,
although admission offers to other UCs are predictive of enrollment, they also correlate with unobserved
student ability, or part of the error term in the college GPA equation.
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also possible that students from lower API deciles are positively selected on leadership,
community involvement, or other non-academic contributions — with these benefits
outweighing any costs to academic performance from the colleges’ perspective.
1.6 Discussion
This paper examines the direct use of a school’s overall achievement or “quality”
in college admissions decisions. Though this is potentially a common practice, it so far
has received little attention in the literature, and its magnitude is largely unknown. This
paper provides an initial attempt to estimate this magnitude across a set of institutions,
using administrative data from the University of California.
Controlling for students’ high school GPA, SAT scores, race, socioeconomic
status, and ELC status, I find a school’s overall achievement (measured by API decile) to
be negatively associated with probability of admission at five out of eight UC campuses
between 2001 and 2006, including five of the six most selective campuses. Averaging
across all campuses, a one-decile increase in API is associated with about a 0.8 percentage
point decrease in admission probability. This marginal effect appears to be larger at the
bottom end of the API distribution, perhaps closer to −1.5 percentage points. Back-of-
the-envelope calculations suggest that this admissions practice increases the share of
attending students from schools below the California median high school by 14 percent,
while decreasing the share from above the median high school by 5 percent.
Due to an inability to observe all items used during admissions, I cannot rule out
the possibility of omitted variables bias. These results are thus presented as more of a
starting point than a definitive answer for the effect of interest.
This paper is otherwise among the first to consider this particular aspect of
how high schools affect access to postsecondary education — an area that is not fully
understood. Future work may further explore this area and build upon these results. For
22
instance, even with the current results, it is unclear what overall share of colleges uses a
similar admissions practice, and whether there exist systematic differences by region, by
selectivity, between public and private colleges, or other dimensions.
Future work may also estimate results from an ex ante perspective. For many
parents and policymakers, the greater interest may be in how school quality affects
admissions/enrollment when families still have a chance to move. While there exists
some evidence of positive ex ante effects (Deming et al., 2014; Berkowitz and Hoekstra,
2011; Dynarski et al., 2013), and general findings of strong demand for higher-achieving
schools (Black, 1999; Rothstein, 2006), there also appear to be instances of families
“trading down” under specific circumstances (Cullen et al., 2013; Cortes and Friedson,
2014). Incentives, as well as families’ perceptions of incentives (perhaps influenced
by salience), may both affect school choice responses in practice. Other authors may
investigate these and other possible behavioral responses, and the resulting impacts on
families.
Chapter 1, in full, is material currently being prepared for submission for publica-
tion. Young, Sam M. The dissertation author was the sole investigator and author of this
paper.
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1.7 Tables and Figures
Figure 1.1. Admissions Criteria for University of California Colleges
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Figure 1.1 Admissions Criteria for University of California Colleges, Continued
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Inset: Description of Educational Environment
Figure 1.2. UCSD Admissions Formula Used Through 2011
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Figure 1.3. Histogram of API Decile Among Applicants
Figure 1.4. Graphical Depiction of Table 1.4 Results
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Table 1.1. Descriptive Statistics
API Deciles
1-2 3-4 5-6 7-8 9-10 All
N 31,847 41,695 47,952 66,255 132,972 320,721
Share of Applicants 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.21 0.41 1
Student Achievement Measures
HS GPA 3.27 3.33 3.40 3.42 3.41 3.38
(0.50) (0.49) (0.47) (0.46) (0.45) (0.47)
SATI Total 982 1071 1132 1173 1235 1161
(152) (170) (164) (158) (147) (175)
AP Courses 6.65 7.07 7.08 7.26 7.39 7.20
(4.98) (5.44) (5.28) (5.45) (5.28) (5.31)
ELCa 0.30 0.27 0.25 0.20 0.12 0.19
Socioeconomic Background
Parental Income Percentile 44.5 56.0 66.7 72.8 78.6 68.4
(26.2) (29.3) (28.9) (27.0) (24.8) (29.1)
Parental Education Percentile 32.3 49.6 61.5 69.6 77.8 65.4
(29.9) (32.0) (29.8) (26.6) (22.5) (30.4)
Underrepresented Minority 0.67 0.40 0.25 0.18 0.09 0.23
White 0.07 0.21 0.35 0.42 0.42 0.35
Asian 0.23 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.40 0.35
Other/Unknown Race 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.08
Admission Rates
Admitted to Berkeley 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.27
Admitted to Los Angeles 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.29 0.26
Admitted to San Diego 0.42 0.45 0.45 0.43 0.45 0.44
Admitted to Irvine 0.44 0.50 0.57 0.59 0.64 0.58
Admitted to Santa Barbara 0.57 0.59 0.60 0.54 0.50 0.54
Admitted to Davis 0.66 0.65 0.62 0.60 0.64 0.63
Admitted to Santa Cruz 0.68 0.75 0.80 0.81 0.82 0.79
Admitted to Riverside 0.78 0.82 0.88 0.89 0.92 0.88
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Admission rates are conditional on applying.
a — ’ELC’ is short for Eligibility in the Local Context, which denotes whether a student
ranks in the top 4% of his/her high school class by GPA. These students are guaranteed
admission to at least one UC campus, but not a campus of the student’s choosing.
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Table 1.2. Probit Average Marginal Effects with Varying Controls
Panel A: Pooled Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
API Decile (10=Highest Achiev.) -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.008***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ELC Status 0.110***
(0.001)
Observations 1,195,656 1,195,656 1,195,656 1,195,656 1,195,656
Pseudo R-squared 0.477 0.498 0.510 0.520 0.527
Panel B: Marginal Effect of API Decile by Campus
Berkeley -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.009***
Los Angeles -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.011***
San Diego -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.011***
Irvine -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.007*** 0.001***
Santa Barbara -0.039*** -0.038*** -0.028*** -0.026*** -0.024***
Davis -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.008***
Santa Cruz -0.005*** -0.004*** 0.000 0.000 0.001*
Riverside 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002***
Application Year (3-Year Bin) Y Y Y Y Y
HSGPA and SATIa Y Y Y Y Y
Other Academic Controlsb Y Y Y Y
Race, Parental Income and Ed. Y Y Y
UC Campuses Appliedc Y Y
Notes: The dependent variable is admission, conditional on having applied. The pooled regression uses
separate intercepts for each campus, but otherwise a single set of coefficients. To maintain the full
sample across specifications, explanatory variables add an indicator for “missing value” when needed.
Except for income percentile, this is typically only a small percentage of cases. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses, clustered by student in the pooled regression. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
a – Includes dummies for bin ranges of high school GPA and SAT Math and Verbal scores, along with
an additional measure known as the Index score, which is a linear combination of high school GPA and
SAT scores. Index score is included using a cubic polynomial.
b – Includes SATII Writing and Third Subject scores, the number of Advanced Placement courses
taken, and intended college major.
c – Includes dummies for whether a student applied to each UC campus, along with the mean SAT
score of attending students among campuses applied.
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Table 1.5. Actual, Predicted, and Counterfactual Admission by API Decile (Percentage
Shares)
Panel A: Actual Admissions
Decile Berkeley Los San Irvine Santa Davis Santa Riverside OverallAngeles Diego Barbara Cruz UC
1 4.6 4.4 3.0 3.5 4.2 3.6 3.7 5.0 3.9
2 4.9 5.4 4.2 4.5 5.0 4.2 3.8 6.2 4.7
3 5.5 6.0 5.5 5.4 5.8 5.2 4.9 7.0 5.7
4 6.2 6.1 6.1 5.7 6.4 6.0 5.5 7.2 6.2
5 6.3 5.6 6.5 6.3 6.9 6.5 6.1 7.3 6.5
6 7.2 6.1 7.4 7.0 7.8 8.3 7.9 7.4 7.5
7 8.6 7.7 8.9 8.6 9.1 8.5 9.6 9.2 8.9
8 10.4 9.6 10.8 10.6 11.2 10.7 12.2 10.6 10.8
9 14.5 14.6 15.2 16.5 14.9 13.8 15.2 15.0 15.0
10 31.9 34.4 32.3 31.9 28.7 33.2 31.2 25.2 30.7
Panel B: Predicted Admissions
Decile Berkeley Los San Irvine Santa Davis Santa Riverside OverallAngeles Diego Barbara Cruz UC
1 4.6 4.3 3.0 3.5 4.2 3.6 3.7 4.9 3.9
2 4.8 5.3 4.2 4.5 4.9 4.2 3.7 6.2 4.7
3 5.4 6.0 5.5 5.3 5.8 5.1 4.9 7.0 5.7
4 6.2 6.1 6.1 5.7 6.4 6.0 5.4 7.2 6.2
5 6.3 5.7 6.5 6.3 6.8 6.5 6.1 7.3 6.5
6 7.2 6.1 7.4 7.0 7.8 8.3 7.9 7.4 7.5
7 8.6 7.8 8.9 8.6 9.2 8.5 9.6 9.2 8.9
8 10.4 9.6 10.8 10.6 11.2 10.8 12.2 10.6 10.9
9 14.5 14.6 15.2 16.5 14.9 13.8 15.2 15.1 15.1
10 31.9 34.4 32.3 32.0 28.8 33.2 31.2 25.2 30.8
Panel C: Counterfactual Admissions
Decile Berkeley Los San Irvine Santa Davis Santa Riverside OverallAngeles Diego Barbara Cruz UC
1 3.0 2.7 2.6 3.4 3.3 3.1 3.7 5.1 3.4
2 3.6 3.3 3.5 4.4 3.8 3.6 3.7 6.2 4.2
3 4.8 4.6 4.8 5.4 4.7 4.7 4.9 7.1 5.2
4 5.6 5.3 5.6 5.9 5.4 5.7 5.4 7.2 5.8
5 6.1 5.6 6.1 6.4 6.0 6.5 6.1 7.3 6.4
6 7.4 6.7 7.3 7.1 7.3 8.6 7.9 7.3 7.5
7 9.0 8.4 9.1 8.8 9.2 8.9 9.7 9.2 9.1
8 11.1 10.7 11.3 10.7 11.7 11.3 12.3 10.6 11.2
9 15.7 16.1 16.1 16.5 16.3 14.5 15.2 14.9 15.6
10 33.7 36.6 33.7 31.6 32.2 33.2 31.0 25.1 31.6
Notes: Cells display the overall percentage across admission cohorts 2001 to 2006. Predicted
admission probabilities are generated by the regression in Table 1.4. Counterfactual admission
probabilities are estimated using those same regression results, but supposing all students are treated
as coming from the 7th API decile.
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Table 1.6. Actual, Predicted, and Counterfactual Enrollment by API Decile (Percentage
Shares)
Panel A: Actual Enrollment
Decile Berkeley Los San Irvine Santa Davis Santa Riverside OverallAngeles Diego Barbara Cruz UC
1 5.0 4.9 2.2 2.9 4.5 3.5 3.4 5.1 3.9
2 4.8 6.2 4.1 3.4 5.1 4.3 3.1 8.3 4.9
3 5.5 7.2 5.6 4.5 6.1 5.8 4.4 9.1 6.0
4 6.2 6.8 6.3 5.0 6.6 7.2 4.7 8.6 6.5
5 6.3 5.9 6.8 6.3 7.3 7.4 6.4 8.9 6.9
6 7.8 6.0 7.8 6.6 8.4 9.8 8.9 7.5 7.8
7 8.5 7.6 9.4 8.8 9.9 9.2 10.7 9.7 9.2
8 10.4 9.6 11.4 11.3 12.3 11.5 14.5 10.4 11.3
9 13.8 15.0 15.7 19.6 16.3 12.9 16.1 13.9 15.4
10 31.7 30.7 30.8 31.6 23.4 28.4 27.7 18.4 28.0
Panel B: Predicted Enrollment
Decile Berkeley Los San Irvine Santa Davis Santa Riverside OverallAngeles Diego Barbara Cruz UC
1 5.1 4.9 2.2 2.8 4.4 3.4 3.4 5.1 3.9
2 4.8 6.1 4.0 3.4 5.0 4.3 3.1 8.2 4.9
3 5.5 7.1 5.5 4.5 6.1 5.7 4.3 9.0 6.0
4 6.2 6.6 6.2 4.9 6.6 7.1 4.8 8.7 6.4
5 6.3 5.8 6.7 6.3 7.2 7.3 6.5 9.0 6.9
6 7.8 5.9 7.6 6.6 8.5 9.8 8.9 7.6 7.8
7 8.5 7.6 9.4 8.9 10.1 9.2 10.7 9.8 9.2
8 10.3 9.6 11.4 11.3 12.4 11.5 14.4 10.5 11.3
9 13.8 15.1 15.7 19.6 16.4 13.0 16.2 13.9 15.4
10 31.5 31.3 31.1 31.7 23.5 28.7 27.7 18.3 28.2
Panel C: Counterfactual Enrollment
Decile Berkeley Los San Irvine Santa Davis Santa Riverside OverallAngeles Diego Barbara Cruz UC
1 3.2 2.8 1.7 2.6 3.1 2.8 3.4 5.2 3.1
2 3.4 3.5 3.1 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.1 8.3 3.9
3 4.8 5.1 4.5 4.6 4.3 4.9 4.3 9.2 5.2
4 5.5 5.6 5.3 5.2 5.0 6.5 4.8 8.8 5.8
5 6.1 5.8 6.1 6.4 5.9 7.3 6.5 9.0 6.6
6 8.0 6.6 7.6 6.8 7.6 10.4 9.0 7.5 7.9
7 9.0 8.4 9.6 9.2 10.1 9.9 10.8 9.7 9.6
8 11.2 11.1 12.1 11.3 13.3 12.3 14.6 10.5 12.0
9 15.2 17.2 17.0 19.4 18.9 14.0 16.0 13.7 16.5
10 33.7 33.9 33.1 31.0 28.5 28.4 27.4 18.1 29.4
Notes: Cells display the overall percentage across admission cohorts 2001 to 2006. Each student’s
probability of enrollment is computed as the product of admission probability and probability
of enrollment conditional on admission. Conditional enrollment probability is estimated using a
probit regression of enrollment on the same explanatory variables in Table 1.4, among the admitted
students at each campus. Predicted and counterfactual admission probabilities are computed the
same way as described in Table 1.5.
33
Ta
bl
e
1.
7.
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
R
es
ul
ts
fo
rC
um
ul
at
iv
e
C
ol
le
ge
G
PA
Pa
ne
lA
:O
rd
in
ar
y
L
ea
st
Sq
ua
re
s
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
B
er
ke
le
y
L
os
A
ng
el
es
Sa
n
D
ie
go
Ir
vi
ne
Sa
nt
a
B
ar
ba
ra
D
av
is
Sa
nt
a
C
ru
z
R
iv
er
si
de
Po
ol
ed
A
PI
D
ec
ile
0.
01
7*
**
0.
02
3*
**
0.
02
2*
**
0.
02
3*
**
0.
02
9*
**
0.
02
8*
**
0.
02
4*
**
0.
02
5*
**
0.
02
4*
**
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
01
)
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
17
,9
31
20
,8
27
20
,5
58
20
,8
42
18
,6
63
23
,2
23
14
,4
27
17
,5
34
15
4,
00
5
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
27
5
0.
30
5
0.
27
4
0.
22
0
0.
32
1
0.
32
0
0.
21
9
0.
20
2
0.
32
7
Pa
ne
lB
:H
ec
km
an
C
or
re
ct
io
n
W
ith
N
o
E
xc
lu
si
on
R
es
tr
ic
tio
ns
A
PI
D
ec
ile
0.
00
2
-0
.0
04
0.
00
3
0.
01
9*
**
0.
02
4
0.
02
4*
**
0.
02
4*
**
0.
02
2*
**
0.
01
0*
*
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
16
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
In
ve
rs
e
M
ill
s
R
at
io
0.
77
4*
**
0.
95
6*
**
1.
43
3*
**
-0
.1
82
0.
16
2
1.
38
3*
**
-0
.0
80
0.
32
2
2.
47
4*
**
(0
.2
31
)
(0
.2
36
)
(0
.4
61
)
(0
.2
52
)
(0
.4
63
)
(0
.4
16
)
(0
.0
50
)
(0
.3
78
)
(0
.6
60
)
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
17
,9
31
20
,8
27
20
,5
58
20
,8
42
18
,6
63
23
,2
23
14
,4
27
17
,5
34
15
4,
00
5
Pa
ne
lC
:H
ec
km
an
C
or
re
ct
io
n
W
ith
O
th
er
U
C
A
dm
is
si
on
O
ff
er
s
A
PI
D
ec
ile
0.
02
0*
**
0.
02
1*
**
0.
02
1*
**
0.
02
5*
**
0.
02
9*
**
0.
02
8*
**
0.
02
4*
**
0.
02
5*
**
0.
02
4*
**
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
01
)
In
ve
rs
e
M
ill
s
R
at
io
-0
.1
54
**
*
0.
06
9*
**
0.
08
5*
**
0.
08
6*
**
0.
02
2
0.
08
8*
**
0.
06
2*
**
0.
05
7*
*
-0
.1
43
**
*
(0
.0
32
)
(0
.0
17
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.0
16
)
(0
.0
15
)
(0
.0
19
)
(0
.0
22
)
(0
.0
12
)
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
17
,9
31
20
,8
27
20
,5
58
20
,8
42
18
,6
63
23
,2
23
14
,4
27
17
,5
34
15
4,
00
5
N
ot
es
:T
he
de
pe
nd
en
tv
ar
ia
bl
e
is
cu
m
ul
at
iv
e
co
lle
ge
G
PA
.A
ll
re
gr
es
si
on
s
in
cl
ud
e
th
e
fu
ll
se
to
fc
on
tr
ol
s
fr
om
Ta
bl
e
1.
2.
H
ec
km
an
re
su
lts
ar
e
es
tim
at
ed
us
in
g
th
e
tw
o-
st
ep
pr
oc
ed
ur
e.
Pa
ne
lB
us
es
no
ad
di
tio
na
ls
el
ec
tio
n
sh
ift
er
s
in
th
e
H
ec
km
an
fir
st
st
ag
e,
w
hi
le
Pa
ne
lC
us
es
du
m
m
ie
s
of
ad
m
is
si
on
of
fe
rs
to
ot
he
rU
C
ca
m
pu
se
s.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
**
*
p<
0.
01
,*
*
p<
0.
05
,*
p<
0.
1.
Chapter 2
The Long-Term Effects of Public
School Choice: Lottery Evidence from
San Diego
2.1 Introduction
Although the public debate over whether to expand school choice in primary and
secondary schools tends to focus on private schools, school choice programs limited
to public school options have proliferated. Public school choice is an increasingly
widespread policy tool aimed at improving public schools. Grady and Bielick (2010)
calculate that between 1993 and 2007 the percentage of students attending public schools
through choice programs rose from 11 to 16%, and that by 2007-2008, 48% of school
districts offered some kind of school choice. These trends are likely to continue in the
wake of ambitious expansions of charter school options in many states, and concomitant
efforts by public school districts to offer alternative forms of school choice such as
magnet schools in response.
Proponents of school choice argue that by giving students and their families a
range of school options they will be able to identify schools that best meet the needs
of those children. They also argue that choice exerts competitive pressures on other
public schools to improve their performance. Critics of choice programs worry that the
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programs will lead schools to segregate along racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic lines.
They also question whether choice programs will truly improve student outcomes.
School districts and the federal government invest substantial sums of money on
school choice. In 2010 the federal government devoted $509 million to various school
choice initiatives, including $100 million to the Magnet Schools Assistance Program and
$256 million to charter schools, among other initiatives (U.S. Department of Education,
2011). Individual school districts collectively spend far more than this on supporting
schools of choice and providing transportation to students. For example, in 2009-2010, a
single school district, San Diego Unified School District, budgeted $9.4 million for its
magnet school program and $39.4 million for transportation services, much but not all of
which was devoted to busing for its various school choice programs (San Diego Unified
School District, 2010).
Given the wide adoption of school choice and the public expenditures it creates,
it is important to know whether school choice improves student outcomes. This study
contributes to a surprisingly small literature looking beyond the immediate impact on
test scores and instead examines high school graduation and postsecondary outcomes.
We argue that these longer term measures of educational attainment are more vital to
adult success than student scores on tests that students will view as low stakes. We study
a variety of high school and postsecondary outcomes using data from seven years of
applications to choice programs in the San Diego Unified School District (SDUSD),
which is the second largest school district in California.
Importantly, schools in these choice programs use a lottery when oversubscribed.
The lottery is crucial because its randomization procedure creates the equivalent of
experimental treatment and control groups, removing statistical bias in non-experimental
studies that may arise due to unobserved differences between those who do and do not
enter school choice programs.
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2.2 Related Literature
There is a large and growing literature on the relation between various forms
of school choice and student achievement in the United States. However, much of the
research uses non-experimental methods which necessitate finding a non-experimental
control group. We briefly review findings of the impact of three forms of school choice
examined in this paper — magnet schools, open enrollment, and voluntary busing aimed
at integrating districts — with an emphasis on lottery-based studies that can exploit
randomization among students.1
Among the papers studying these forms of school choice, we know of only one
paper, by Deming, Hastings, Kane and Staiger (2014), that uses lottery data to rigorously
analyze the effect of school choice on postsecondary outcomes. The general literature
instead focuses mostly on test scores.2 The shortage of studies looking beyond test scores
is unfortunate, as a good school can likely help students in ways that test scores cannot
measure. Indeed, Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua (2006) make a persuasive case that what
they label non-cognitive skills may be as important as cognitive skills in determining
adult outcomes.
2.2.1 Achievement of Students Participating in Choice
Magnet Schools
Ballou (2009) reviews the literature on magnet schools and achievement, and finds
four studies that use lotteries to estimate causal impacts, and overall he reports mixed
results. (One of these papers, Betts, Rice, Zau, Tang and Koedel (2006), henceforth Betts
1Separate literatures exist on charter schools and voucher programs. For recent reviews of the literature
on charter schools, see Betts and Tang (2014) and Epple, Romano and Zimmer (2015b). For a recent
meta-analysis of the U.S. and international literatures on vouchers, see Shakeel, Anderson and Wolf (2016).
Other useful reviews of vouchers include Figlio (2009), Epple, Romano and Urquiola (2015a) and Egalite
and Wolf (2016).
2Unlike the case for the types of school choice we study, a number of papers on charter schools have
looked at postsecondary outcomes. See Betts and Tang (2014) for a review.
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et al. (2006), finds mostly no effects of winning a magnet school lottery in San Diego
Unified School District, but a moderate positive impact on mathematics achievement
in magnet high schools. They study only a single year of school choice applications,
compared to the seven years studied here.) More recently, Betts, Kitmitto, Levin, Bos
and Eaton (2015) study a national sample of elementary schools that converted to magnet
schools and found no overall impact on the achievement of resident students, although
results varied school by school.
Open Enrollment
Four recent studies use lotteries to evaluate the impact of open enrollment policies.
In the paper most closely related to the current piece, Deming, Hastings, Kane
and Staiger (2014) study postsecondary outcomes in Charlotte-Mecklenburg. They find
evidence that students whose neighborhood public school was of low quality had better
postsecondary outcomes if they won a lottery to attend another high school through an
open enrollment program, with girls benefiting more than boys.
Several papers have examined K-12 school outcomes. Cullen, Jacob and Levitt
(2006) provide analysis of the Chicago Public Schools’ (CPS’) open enrollment program.
Focusing on applications to the district’s high schools, they find that lottery winners and
losers fare almost identically on subsequent tests of math and reading achievement, and
other measures of academic outcomes such as absences and courses completed. However,
after the lottery, lottery winners are slightly less likely to be arrested than lottery losers.
Betts et al. (2006) provide an experimental analysis of the impact of open enrollment
programs on math and reading achievement in SDUSD, using data for roughly 2,000
students who applied to various lotteries in 2001. They find, in almost all cases, that
lottery winners in the district’s open enrollment program fare no better or worse in math
and reading than did lottery losers one, two and three years after the lottery. Hastings,
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Kane and Staiger (2009) study school choice in Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina
and conclude that there are heterogeneous effects on test scores, with bigger academic
gains to students whose families seek high value-added schools.
Traditional Busing
Bradley and Bradley (1977), Crain and Mahard (1978, 1981) and Cook et al.
(1984) summarize the voluminous early literature on the effect of busing programs
designed to integrate schools racially. Early studies tended to find no (or in a few cases
positive) effects on achievement. Betts et al. (2006) find no impact on test scores from
SDUSD’s traditional busing program, VEEP, based on a one-year sample of lottery
applications.
In conclusion, we note that although there exists a non-lottery based literature
that focuses mostly on the impact on test scores, the lottery-based literature is smaller.
Only one of the lottery-based papers on the impact of magnet schools, open enrollment
and voluntary busing school choice examines longer-term student educational outcomes,
which is the main goal of the current paper.
2.2.2 School Choice in San Diego
School choice is popular in SDUSD. At the start of our study period (2001-02),
roughly 25% of students attended a school outside their local attendance zone through
one of the district’s choice programs, with this number growing to 40% in 2009-10.
Furthermore, because SDUSD uses a random drawing process to admit applicants to
schools, the district provides an excellent opportunity to causally analyze the impact of
school choice on student outcomes.
During the period we study, SDUSD students who wished to attend a public
school other than their neighborhood school had four main options available: magnet
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schools, the Voluntary Enrollment Exchange Program (VEEP), the state-mandated open
enrollment program (known locally as School Choice), and charter schools. In addition,
Program Improvement School Choice (PISC), initiated in fall 2002, responded to the
No Child Left Behind (NCLB) requirements to provide choice options to students at
schools that fail to make Adequate Yearly Progress in a given subject for two consecutive
years. SDUSD met this challenge by using or adapting its bus routes under the VEEP and
Magnet programs to provide school choice to such students. Students who were eligible
for PISC were also given higher priority within the VEEP and Magnet programs, and
were more likely to gain admission than other students.
SDUSD’s magnet school and Voluntary Enrollment Exchange Program (VEEP)
have their roots in a court desegregation order in 1977, and have operated for almost forty
years. Since 1993, SDUSD has also had an open enrollment program mandated under
California state law, known as Choice. (See Zau and Betts (2005) for more information
on the history of school choice in SDUSD.) Thus, the programs are well-established,
with histories tracing back two to four decades. Charter schools also have become an
important and well established component of SDUSD. By 2009-2010, 41 charters schools
accounted for 11% of district enrollment.
In fall 2009 the percentages of students in each program were 9% in magnet
schools, 6% in VEEP, 14% in Choice, and 11% in charters. PISC enrollment totaled
7% of students, spread across the Magnet, VEEP and Choice programs, plus a small
percentage of students in transportation routes specifically designed for PISC.
During the application years we study, fall 2001 to fall 2007, the district dis-
tributed a detailed brochure to each family early in the school year, advertising the
various choices available. Parents then had until mid-winter to apply to any of these
choice programs. Where necessitated by over-subscription, the district held a central-
ized random drawing to determine which students were accepted to a given school and
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program. (Except for three charter schools converted from regular public schools, the
district did not process applications for charter schools.)
Students could apply to any VEEP, Magnet, Choice, and charter schools in a
given year. All four options were readily available to elementary, middle and high
school students. To be eligible for PISC, however, a student had to be attending a school
designated as needing program improvement because it had failed to meet requirements
of California’s definition of Adequate Yearly Progress (under NCLB) for two years in a
row.
Magnet Schools
At its inception, the goal of the magnet school program was to attract students
from primarily white areas into non-white areas by offering specialized curricula and
additional resources such as reduced teacher/student ratios, teaching labs, and field trips.
In some cases magnet schools attempted to create flows in the opposite direction, into
schools in predominantly white areas, in order to provide students with opportunities they
would not otherwise have at their neighborhood school and to improve the diversity of
the student body. As of the 2010-11 school year, 32 magnet schools operated in SDUSD,
up slightly from 29 magnet schools in the 2001-02 school year.
Any student who resided within the district’s boundaries could apply to a magnet
school. Admissions otherwise used lotteries with two dimensions of priority sorting,
before random numbers entered. The first dimension is unique to magnet schools (not
present in the other choice types), and is intended to encourage greater integration. Stu-
dents were grouped into one of four “clusters” based on their local default school. These
clusters were sorted by racial composition, with cluster 1 having the largest percentage
of white students, and cluster 4 having the largest percentage of non-white students.
Magnet schools with a large percentage of white students first accepted applications
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from students living in cluster 4, then 3, 2, and 1. Conversely, schools with a large
percentage of non-white students accepted applications in cluster order 1, 2, 3, and 4.
(Within each cluster, however, no distinction was made between applicants of different
races and ethnicities.) After this consideration of students’ school cluster, priority was
then assigned based on factors like whether a student had a sibling already attending the
school. This second dimension of sorting is common to all types of school choice that
we study, and not just magnet schools.
The district provided transportation for district students who attend a magnet
school outside of their neighborhood and had a walking distance greater than two miles.
These students were termed “non-resident” students. Non-resident attendees of magnets
accounted for 8.5% of district enrollment in 2009-2010, up from 6.2% in 2001-2002.
In the last few years, non-residents have accounted for one-third to one-half of total
enrollment at these magnets. Demand for these programs was high during the years we
study, and not all students could be accommodated. In 2001-2002, there were 17,621
applications to magnet schools from 11,368 applicants, for 2,217 open slots.
The Voluntary Enrollment Exchange Program (VEEP)
The VEEP program typically attracted students from primarily non-white neigh-
borhoods to schools in primarily white neighborhoods. VEEP, formerly known as the
Voluntary Ethnic Enrollment Program, for many years supported a court desegregation
order. Throughout the period that we study, however, the district was no longer under
court supervision and did not focus solely on racial and ethnic integration, precipitating
the name change. The program sought to increase diversity among students in the re-
ceiving schools, and to improve achievement among VEEP students by enabling them to
attend higher-performing schools.
As with magnet schools, the district provided transportation for VEEP. Unlike
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the magnet program, however, VEEP limited the choices available to each student, so as
to contain the costs of transportation. It did so by offering students in “VEEP-sending”
schools a short list of VEEP-receiving schools to which they could apply.
The district allowed students of any race to apply to the VEEP program. The
nature of the VEEP sending/receiving schools still tended to lead to racial and ethnic
desegregation, but not as strongly as in the past because, for instance, white students at
VEEP-sending schools could now apply to leave for schools that typically have a greater
share of white students than their current schools. The program was open to all students
who resided in the local attendance zone of a school with a VEEP pattern. VEEP students
at the elementary level followed the feeder pattern of their new school, rather than having
to return to their neighborhood for middle and high schools.
Receiving schools, in conjunction with the district’s Enrollment Options Office,
determined the number of slots available at the school each year. As with the magnet
program, demand for this program was strong. In 2001-2002, there were 8,099 applica-
tions from 5,636 applicants, for a total of 2064 available slots. VEEP’s share of district
enrollment fell slightly between fall 2001 and fall 2009, from 6.4% to 5.9% of district
enrollment.
The application process for VEEP was similar to magnet schools: students who
applied before a mid-winter cutoff date were given first priority, and siblings of students
currently in the program were at the top of that list. Wait lists did not carry over, so if
a student was not accepted (did not “win” the random lottery), he or she would have
to re-apply the following year. Admission was also based on availability, with the
highest-achieving schools typically having the fewest openings due to demand.
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School Choice (Open Enrollment) Program
The third choice program, the district-wide School Choice program, provided any
student with the opportunity to attend any school within the district’s boundaries. It is
mandated by state law passed in 1993 as a way of increasing the options for every student.
The main drawback of this program is the lack of district-provided transportation. In
2001-2002, there were 12,705 applications from 8,311 applicants for 3045 new slots.
This program has grown markedly, doubling its share of district enrollment between fall
2001 and fall 2009, to 13.6%.
Charter Schools
Charter schools — or publicly funded schools that operate more independently
of the school district than traditional public schools — are an increasingly popular
alternative to the traditional school. These schools obtain their charters from the district,
which in turn provides oversight. As of 2009-2010, 41 charter schools accounted for
10.8% of district enrollment, up from 5.5% in 2001-2002.
Apart from a few settings such as New York City, it is a commonplace finding
that charter schools are not oversubscribed, and thus do not conduct lotteries. Gleason
et al. (2010) conducted the first nationwide lottery-based study of charter schools. They
focus on middle schools, and report having exceptional difficulty finding charter schools
that were oversubscribed. Indeed, only 130 out of 492 such schools nationwide used ad-
mission lotteries, and only a fraction of these schools agreed to participate, compounding
potential selection effects. Thus the problem we face in San Diego with a lack of lottery
data mirrors the (lack of) use of lotteries nationwide. Due to the lack of lottery data for
charter schools, we do not examine this type of school choice.
44
2.3 Data and Methods
2.3.1 Sample and Lottery Basics
SDUSD began to use a lottery to admit students to school choice programs in
2001. We have access to lotteries from fall 2001 through fall 2007, a total of 7 years.
We restrict our sample to applications to middle and high schools, in grades 6 to 12,
because most students applying to the elementary grades (grade 5 and below) have either
not graduated from high school, or graduated too recently for our desired postsecondary
outcomes to be well-defined.3 We also omit all applicants who applied from outside the
district, regardless of whether they won or lost their lotteries. Our concern was that we
would typically only observe follow-up data for these out-of-district lottery winners, and
not the lottery losers, making for an unfair comparison.4
In any lottery-based study, it is crucial to know about the rigor with which the
lottery is conducted, and whether it is conducted consistently over time. The same district
staff member in the central district offices conducted the lotteries each of the years we
studied.
After the student applied to a specific school and grade, applications were assigned
to priority groups (such as sibling reunification) within school and grade. Lotteries
were then conducted, with separate lotteries for each school, grade and priority group.
Applications received random numbers within each school × year × grade × priority
group cell. Based on their random number, students were contacted in strict rank order
and offered admission. An identical approach was taken for all three of the choice
programs. Figure 1 illustrates using a simple hypothetical example. In this example, a
true lottery occurs for group B. Figure 2 shows the full list of priority groupings for all
3Results were similar when we added elementary school applications to our analysis.
4That is, the admission offer itself makes it much more likely for out-of-district lottery winners to
transfer to SDUSD than out-of-district lottery losers, who do not receive such an offer.
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three choice types, which sometimes vary by year.
In many cases, all students in the top priority group(s) for a given school and
grade were admitted, since the enrollment limit was large enough to accommodate all
of these students. However, the enrollment limit would often “hit” within some lower
priority group. Students in this priority group experienced a “true” lottery, in that some
students were admitted and others not, depending on their random number draw. There
also exist cases where students in all priority groups were admitted to a given school and
grade, signaling that the school truly was not oversubscribed in that grade. However,
since the randomization from the lottery is essential for obtaining exogenous variation,
we do not include such cases because there is no randomly created control group.
Analytically, we treat each lottery as a separate experiment. Thus, in addition to
applying to the same school in the same year, students must also be in the same grade
level and priority group to be compared against one another. We do so because students
who apply to (e.g.) grade 6 at a magnet school may not be identical on average to students
who apply to the same magnet in grade 7. Further, among the applications to a given
school and grade, students in the (e.g.) sibling reunification group are likely to differ
from students in the other priority groups.
Overall, we identified, for students applying to choice programs for grades 6-12,
the number of true lotteries and applications listed in Table 2.1. The bottom part of
the table displays mean characteristics of the students making the applications to each
program. For both the Magnet and VEEP programs, students’ baseline reading and math
scores are below the district average (scores are scaled to have a mean of zero and standard
deviation of one within the district), and Hispanic and black students represent the two
largest racial/ethnic groups applying. Very few students applying to these programs have
a parent who holds a Bachelor’s degree or higher. The open enrollment program, known
as Choice, attracts an applicant pool that is quite different. Their baseline math and
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reading scores are above the district average, the two largest racial/ethnic groups among
applicants are Hispanics and whites. Notably, 40 percent of students applying to Choice
have parents with a Bachelor’s degree or higher, compared to just 21 and 11 percent for
Magnet and VEEP programs, respectively. The intuition for this difference is that unlike
the Magnet and VEEP programs, Choice does not provide busing, thus requiring families
to drive their students to choice schools, or to make other transportation arrangements.
Providing this transportation may prove more difficult for families with fewer resources.5
2.3.2 Outcomes of Interest
We examine the impact of winning a lottery to attend a middle or high school
through a school choice program on two types of outcomes: (1) outcomes which are
measured during the high school years but which are likely to be related to longer term
outcomes such as college graduation and earnings, and (2) postsecondary outcomes. The
specific outcomes are detailed below.
High School Outcomes
Because we focus on those applying to school choice programs in grades 6 to 12,
we include a number of secondary school outcomes:
• An indicator for student being on track in grade 9, meaning that they passed at
least ten units, had no more than one semester F in a college preparatory course,
and maintained a Grade Point Average (GPA) of at least 2.06
• An indicator for student passing the California High School Exit Examination in
their first attempt in grade 10
5Koedel, Betts, Rice and Zau (2009) show that the Magnet and VEEP programs tend to integrate
SDUSD racially and in terms of socioeconomic status, but that the Choice program slightly increases
segregation. They argue that the lack of busing for Choice explains why its impact on segregation is
different.
6We include the GPA provision because throughout the period studied SDUSD required students to
have a GPA of at least 2.0 in order to graduate.
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• The percentage of days attended in grade 12
• The GPA in grade 12
• The citizenship grade in grade 12 (based on teachers’ report card reports on
behavior in each class, this measure is an average across all courses, scaled to 0 to
4)
• An indicator for whether the student graduated on time
Postsecondary Outcomes
We examine two types of postsecondary outcomes — enrollment and degree
attainment — at various points after high school graduation. For students indicated as
dropouts in the data, prior to high school graduation, we maintain these students in our
analysis but set all postsecondary outcomes to zero.
i) Enrollment
• Three separate indicators for postsecondary enrollment in the first year after high
school graduation: enrollment in any postsecondary institution; enrollment in
two-year institutions; and enrollment in four-year institutions.
• Three separate continuous measures for the number of years of postsecondary
enrollment in the first four years after high school graduation: the number of years
in any postsecondary institution; the number of years in two-year institutions; and
the number of years in four-year institutions.
ii) Degree Attainment
• Three indicators for Bachelor’s degree within four, five or six years of high school
graduation
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• Three indicators for an Associate’s degree or other community college graduation
event within four, five and six years of high school graduation
The postsecondary data are derived from the National Student Clearinghouse
(NSC). The NSC is a nationwide student-level database of postsecondary enrollment and
degrees granted for postsecondary institutions, which jointly account for about 93% of
total postsecondary enrollment nationwide. In the NSC data, many of the San Diego
community colleges did not name the degrees awarded, and so for two-year colleges, our
outcome consists of a measure of an Associate’s degree or any graduation event recorded
by a two-year college. This measure thus combines Associate degrees and sub-Associate
certificates.
2.3.3 Estimating Treatment Effects
The first central part of our analysis consists of generating intent-to-treat (ITT)
estimates of the impact of winning a lottery to either the Magnet, VEEP, or Open
Enrollment (“Choice”) programs. Our ITT equations typically take the form:
Yijgst =
J∑
j=1
αj +WINijsgβ + δMS
M
i,0 + δRS
R
i,0 +MALEiγ + ijgst (2.1)
where i indexes students, j indexes lotteries, and g and s denote the intended grade
level and school of the lottery application, with g ∈ {6, 7, ..., 12}.7 The base year of the
application is defined as time 0, such that Yijstg denotes an outcome measured t years
after the application year, and all other subscripts continue to refer to the original lottery
application.
We model these outcomes as a function of, most importantly, a dummy variable
WINijsg indicating whether the student won the given lottery, and lottery fixed effects,
7The lottery indicator j makes s and g subscripts redundant, since lotteries are specific to a given school
and grade (and lottery group). However, we include s and g for clarity.
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αj . Other terms in the equation include math and reading achievement from state-
administered standardized tests, expressed as Z-scores, from the baseline school year in
which the student applies (the Si,0 terms); a dummy variable for males; and an error term
ijstg.8 The coefficient of interest is βˆ, which states the estimated impact of winning a
lottery on the given outcome. We also cluster standard errors by lottery in all regressions.
It is important to obtain ITT estimates, as described above, because they tell poli-
cymakers the gains from making one more school choice offer. However, policymakers
are also interested in knowing the causal impact on a student of entering a school choice
program. This impact of treatment on the treated will generally be bigger than the intent
to treat estimate because not all lottery winners take the offer (the take-up effect). We
can estimate the impact of winning a lottery and attending the lottery school using two
stage least squares (2SLS), in which we instrument for the new regressor of interest
— enrolling at the school to which the student applied the next year — with a dummy
variable indicating whether the student won the lottery. This approach simply scales up
the intent-to-treat estimate by the reciprocal of the of the take-up rate.9 This approach
assumes the entire intent-to-treat effect derives from students who win the lottery and
actually enroll at that school the following year. It otherwise assumes no causal effect on
lottery winners who do not take up the offer.
There is a second and broader adjustment that one can make to the ITT estimator
to estimate the impact of treatment on the treated. This second approach not only accounts
for lottery winners who do not switch to the school, but for students who lose a lottery
but manage to gain entry to another school of choice by winning a different lottery (the
8If the lottery is conducted fairly, then we should obtain unbiased causal estimates of the impact of
winning a lottery from equation (1) even if we exclude the baseline achievement and male indicator.
However, their inclusion can increase precision. We replicated all models without the baseline test scores
and results were generally similar but less precise.
9Bloom (1984) is one of the early papers suggesting this scaling factor, although not in an instrumental
variables framework. Thus, the estimator is essentially what has become known as the single Bloom
adjustment, although the 2SLS approach also makes appropriate adjustments to the standard errors.
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substitution or cross-over effect). In this version of estimating the average impact of
treatment on the treated, we can use an instrumental variables (IV) approach in which we
first alter equation (1) so that the regressor of interest is not the indicator for winning a
lottery, but whether the student the following year switched into any school participating
in the given choice program. We then instrument for this endogenous variable using
the indicator for whether the student won the current school choice lottery (lottery j).
Mechanically, the IV estimator is identical to dividing the ITT estimates by (b − a),
where b is the proportion of lottery winners who accept the admission offer and a is
the proportion of lottery losers who nonetheless enter another school of choice (e.g. by
winning in another lottery).10 Some researchers refer to this as the double Bloom (1984)
adjustment.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Testing for Lottery Fairness and Differential Attrition
We define the lottery process as “fair” if there is no statistically significant differ-
ence in observable characteristics between lottery winners and lottery losers. Because
all of our outcome variables are related in some way to academic achievement, it is
particularly important to test whether the initial test scores of applicants who win a
given lottery and those who lose a given lottery are identical. If we retain the null of no
difference in baseline test scores between lottery winners and losers, it greatly buttresses
the argument that the lottery is conducted fairly.
Since lotteries differ greatly in their percentages of winners and losers, we do not
show a summary statistics table comparing the average characteristics of winners and
losers, which in this context compares more across lotteries than within a given lottery.
10This statement is in fact contingent upon identical treatment effects across lotteries. See section 5 of
Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999), for a description of the underlying assumptions.
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Instead we use a regression approach: regressing a given characteristic on lottery fixed
effects plus an indicator for whether a student won a given lottery. These results are
displayed in Table 2.2.
The first two rows of Table 2.2 show the coefficient for lottery winners in models
of baseline Z-scores in math and reading — that is, in the year that students applied
— for true lotteries. For none of the three types of school choice is there a significant
difference between lottery winners and losers in baseline test scores. The third row
examines whether the presence of these lagged test scores, which we include as controls
in our impact analysis below, are equally likely to be missing for lottery winners and
losers. No significant differences emerge. The next six rows of Table 2.2 test for any
differences in basic demographics between lottery winners and losers. We find no
meaningful differences here, except that lottery winners are slightly more likely to be
white (about 2.0 percentage points more likely, when pooling across all three choice
types). Despite generally few differences in observed characteristics between lottery
winners and losers, we control for baseline achievement in math and reading, as well as
gender, in all outcome models as a precaution.
The final row of Table 2.2 does not test for lottery fairness so much as differential
attrition. The outcome here is whether the student leaves the district the year after
the school choice application, based on enrollment records. We find no significant
differences for Magnet or VEEP programs, but a small but significant difference for the
Choice program, and in the pooled case. This result hints at differential attrition between
lottery winners and losers. Table A7 of the appendix presents additional results about
differential attrition, on an outcome-by-outcome basis. For most outcomes that we study,
we see a slightly higher rate of attrition among lottery losers than lottery winners, though
this difference often is not statistically significant. Differential attrition appears most
pronounced for postsecondary graduation outcomes, specifically, which contain all of the
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significant cases in Table A7.
2.4.2 Verification That the Intensity of the Treatment Contrast Is
Large
One concern is whether the intensity of the treatment contrast is large between
students’ local schools and the schools to which they apply. Because many of the
factors that influence a student’s educational trajectory are not readily observed, we
cannot measure the differences in all of the relevant measures of school and classroom
environment. However, we can test for differences in observable characteristics.11
Therefore, we compare lottery winners’ local school with the school to which they
applied. The comparisons include 14 variables — nine related to academic and behavioral
outcomes for students attending each school, and five measures of the socioeconomic and
racial/ethnic mix of the student body. All these variables are averaged for each school
over the school years 2001-2002 through 2007-2008.
We derive many of the school academic measures from the statewide achievement
test, the California Standards Test (CST), which during the period we study tested
students annually in reading and mathematics between grades 2 and 11. We transformed
test scores for students into Z-scores by grade and year. For English we averaged the
Z-scores across the middle or high school for all students enrolled (up to grade 11).
A limitation of the math scores is that, after grade 7, students were given math tests
that varied depending on the math course taken, making it very difficult to compare
achievement among all students in any grade above grade 7. Therefore, for math CST
results we were able to characterize middle schools by math performance in grades 6 and
7 only, omitting grade 8. For the same reason we lacked math scores for high schools,
11Research by Betts, Zau and Rice (2003) suggests that San Diego schools, especially at the middle and
high school levels, vary considerably in terms of peer achievement and the qualifications of teachers, and
that these variables are associated with the student’s own subsequent gains in achievement.
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and so in the tables described below school math performance results include only middle
schools. We characterized schools by four test-score measures: average Z-scores in
reading and math, and average school value-added. The latter we calculated by regressing
test scores on students’ lagged test scores, as well as controls for gender, race/ethnicity,
parental education level and grade level, and then averaging the residuals for each school.
Other academic measures of the schools included the percentage of students who
attended that school who ultimately graduated on time, the percentage of days absent, the
percentage of students on track in grade 9, and a citizenship grade. For middle schools,
the measures on on-time graduation and being on track in grade 9 are observed during
high school but calculated among all students who attended the given middle school. But
the absence and citizenship variables refer to outcomes while the students were attending
the given middle or high school. Being on track in grade 9 means that a student in his
or her first time in grade 9 completed at least the expected ten units, with no more than
one F in a college-preparatory course, and with a cumulative GPA of at least 2.0. (A
cumulative GPA of 2.0 has been a graduation requirement in the district for the entire
period we study.) The citizenship variable is averaged over the citizenship grade that
every teacher gives to students in their classes in the respective middle and high schools.
It provides important insights into teachers’ views of how well behaved students are in
the classroom, and thus provides a proxy for the non-cognitive behavior of students at a
school.
School comparisons also include socioeconomic measures including the propor-
tion of students from each of four racial/ethnic groups, and the proportion of students
whose parents hold a Bachelor’s or higher degree.
Tables 2.3A–2.3C compare the local schools and the schools to which students
applied in the Magnet, VEEP and Choice programs, respectively, while Table 2.3D pools
all three programs. The sample consists of applications to true lotteries, in which students
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were both lotteried in and lotteried out. Tables show the mean of the given characteristic
in the school to which the student applied, the mean difference between the choice school
and the student’s local default school, along with the p-value for a test that the local
school and the choice school were identical on the given characteristic.
Several striking patterns emerge. First, across all three types of choice, and in
the pooled analysis in Table 2.3D, the mean difference between the school in the choice
program and the student’s local default school is highly significant, with p-values well
below 0.01.
Second, the differences mostly indicate that students were applying to schools
that outperformed the local schools across the panoply of academic measures, as well
as the two behavioral outcomes: the citizenship grades and percentage of days absent.
The schools to which students applied also tended to have student bodies with a higher
socioeconomic status and a greater proportion of white students, and a lower proportion
of black and especially Hispanic students. The lone exception is magnet schools, for
which the schools to which students applied had about 2 percentage points more black
students. This could reflect both the result of past moves to these schools by non-resident
black students as well as the fact that most of the magnet schools operated in lower-
income areas of the city and offered specific curricular emphases in the hope of attracting
students from higher income areas of the district. Results on the proportion Asian are
mixed but the differences were closer to zero than for the other groups.
A third striking result from the tables is that the value-added in test scores at
the schools to which students applied was near zero, meaning that student gains in
achievement were on average similar to the district as a whole. (Value-added here
is computed based on all students at each school, rather than just lottery applicants.)
Nonetheless, value-added was significantly higher at the choice schools relative to the
local schools in all but one of eight cases. (The exception was middle school math at
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magnet schools, where math value-added was lower by 0.05 standard deviation than at
local public schools.) That is, in all but one case, students were applying to schools
where students made more progress on average in reading and math than at the student’s
local school. Of course, parents cannot readily observe value-added but do observe
average achievement through annual publication of CST results. These test score levels
were consistently higher at the choice schools, ranging from 0.16 to 0.65 of a standard
deviation.
The overall conclusion is that in our sample of applications to true lotteries,
students were on average applying to schools that differed significantly from their local
schools. Schools of choice had higher test scores and value-added in test scores, better
behavioral outcomes and better outcomes in high school such as graduating on time.
They also tended to have greater proportions of students who were white and whose
parents held a Bachelor’s degree or higher.
2.4.3 Intent to Treat Estimates
We begin with an intent-to-treat analysis of the impact of winning a lottery to
any of the programs. Tables 2.4–2.6 summarize the key coefficient (βˆ) and its standard
error for high school outcomes, postsecondary enrollment outcomes, and postsecondary
graduation outcomes, respectively.12 To help provide context for the size of estimated
impacts, the bottom row of these tables shows the mean value of the outcomes for the
students in the pooled set of applications.
In Table 2.4, we see that there were no statistically significant differences between
lottery winners and losers for any of the six high school outcomes, for any of Magnet,
VEEP, or Choice. The final row pools all of the lotteries across the three types of choice
and again finds no significant differences. Further, the coefficients were typically small,
12Appendix tables A8 to A10 show slightly more detailed versions of these results, providing additional
information about R-squared, the number of observations, and number of clusters.
56
with roughly as many negative as positive.
Table 2.5 shows results when we model the number of years enrolled in postsec-
ondary education by given numbers of years after high school graduation. As mentioned
earlier, postsecondary outcomes are set to 0 for high school dropouts. Again, with one
exception, none of the ITT estimates is statistically significant. The exception is that
when we pool all types of school choice, the number of years enrolled in a two-year
college four years after graduation is 0.08 higher for lottery winners. This pooled result
probably derives from the VEEP and Choice lotteries, where positive estimates were
close to becoming significant. Note however that there is no overall significant effect
on overall time enrolled in postsecondary education, and that the estimated effect on
enrollment on four-year college enrollment is negative, although not significant. This
pattern of findings hints weakly at the possibility that VEEP and Choice programs could
induce a slight substitution towards two-year and away from four-year colleges.
Table 2.6 shows impacts of winning a lottery on degrees obtained four, five and
six years after high school graduation. As discussed earlier, our community college
graduation measure combines Associate degrees and sub-Associate certificates. For
Magnet, VEEP, and the pooled case, there is a significant 1-3 percentage point increase
in the likelihood that lottery winners complete an Associate or other two-year college
certification four or five years after high school graduation. However, no significant
effect is found six years after high school graduation. One interpretation is that winning
a school choice lottery may accelerate time to degree for community college degrees and
certificates, while having no impact on the overall probability of obtaining a degree or
certificate by six years after graduation.
For the most part, Table 2.6 shows no significant relationship between winning a
lottery and whether students subsequently obtain a Bachelor’s degree. One exception
is that winners of magnet school lotteries appear to be about 5 percentage points less
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likely to obtain a Bachelor’s degree within six years of high school graduation. Another
exception is that Choice lottery winners are about four percentage points less likely to
obtain a Bachelor’s within four years of graduation, but for these students, no significant
difference remains between lottery winners and losers five or six years after graduation.
Table A11 of the appendix provides an alternative view, combining 2-year and
4-year college certifications into a single outcome measured 4, 5, and 6 years after high
school graduation. Using this version of the outcomes, ITT estimates of the effects on
postsecondary degree attainment remain mostly insignificant. At four years after high
school graduation, lottery winners in the VEEP program have about a 4 percentage point
higher chance of having either a 2-year or 4-year college certification compared to lottery
losers. But this effect subsequently dissipates and becomes insignificant. For none of
the choice programs, nor the pooled case, is there a significant impact on the combined
outcome of having either a 2-year or 4-year college certification either five or six years
after high school graduation.
Overall, our ITT analysis of the impact of choice on postsecondary enrollment
and degrees suggests some additional interest in 2-year colleges, but perhaps partly as
a result of students shifting away from 4-year colleges, rather than all new interest in
postsecondary education. We find some evidence of positive and significant effects on
both enrollment and degree completion at 2-year colleges, while estimated impacts for
4-year colleges are typically negative (though usually not significant). Results are usually
insignificant when looking at degree completion or the total number of years enrolled in
either type of program, combined.
For students who applied to only one school, the intent-to-treat estimate is straight-
forward to interpret: it is the impact of being offered a chance to enroll in the choice
school, instead of enrolling in the default local school. Interpretation is somewhat more
difficult in cases where students applied to multiple schools. Now, we are estimating
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the impact of making one more offer to attend a choice school than the student would
otherwise have received. It could be that the first lottery won has the biggest impact.
(If all the schools to which a student applied offered similar advantages over the local
school, then the impact of winning a lottery could be smaller if the student had already
won a lottery to another the schools to which she applied.)
To examine this possibility, we re-ran all the intent-to-treat estimates for each
type of choice, as well as pooled, after restricting the sample to students who had applied
to only one school. If we found much bigger estimated impacts, and impacts that were
significant, in this exercise, it would support the notion that most of the gains from school
choice accrue with the first lottery won. However, we found almost identical patterns of
statistical significance to those reported above. In some cases coefficients were slightly
bigger, but in almost all cases the estimated impacts remained insignificant.
2.4.4 Estimated Impacts of Treatment on the Treated
Tables 2.7–2.9 show estimates of the impact of treatment on the treated for the sets
of high school outcomes, measures of postsecondary enrollment and college graduation,
respectively. Table 2.7 shows no significant effect of enrolling in the school to which a
student applied on various high school outcomes. The precision varies by type of school
choice and outcome. While there are some quite precise “zero” estimates, the magnet
school estimate of the impact on the probability of graduating on time is both large and
imprecise. The estimated impact is about 0.10, with a 95% confidence interval of roughly
-0.07 to 0.27.
Table 2.8 turns to the impact of winning a lottery and enrolling on six different
measures of the number of years of postsecondary enrollment. In general there are no
significant estimated impacts. The only exception is that the impact of winning a Choice
(open enrollment) lottery on the number of years enrolled in a two-year college within
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one and four years of high school graduation are significant, with effects of 0.14 and
0.44 respectively. When we pooled across types of school choice, we found a significant
0.27-year increase in the number of years enrolled in a two-year college four years
after high school graduation. This pooled effect probably derives mainly from the large
and significant effect for Choice. Countering these positive effects on two-year college
enrollment, the table provides some evidence that Choice may cause substitution away
from four-year colleges to two-year colleges: the impact of winning a Choice lottery
and enrolling on number of years of postsecondary enrollment is never significant, but
the negative point estimates suggest that Choice is associated with lower enrollment in
four-year colleges.
Table 2.9 examines the impact of winning a lottery and enrolling on postsecondary
degrees and certificates. Again, in most cases the impacts are not statistically significant,
but exceptions emerge. For all cases except Choice, the impact of winning a lottery
and enrolling is linked to a modest but significant boost in the probability of earning
a community college Associate degree or certificate within four and/or five years, but
the effects become insignificant after six years. As for the Bachelor’s outcomes, most
of the estimates are insignificant. Both exceptions point to negative impacts. The more
notable finding is that, for those who won a Magnet lottery and enrolled at the magnet,
there is an estimated drop in the probability of earning a Bachelor’s degree six years after
graduating from high school of 0.22. This is a large effect, given that the proportion of
all students in the pooled set of true lotteries who obtained a Bachelor’s degree after six
years was 0.183.13 Second, winning a Choice lottery and enrolling is associated with a
drop of 0.12 in the probability of obtaining a Bachelor’s degree in four years, but the
impacts after five and six years are very close to zero and are not significant.
13We find some corroboration for this effect in Table 2.8, where the estimated number of years enrolled
in a four-year college after six years was negative for magnet schools, although very imprecisely estimated.
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Table 2.10 shows the impact of winning a lottery and enrolling the following year
in any school participating in the given type of school choice. In general the coefficients
are higher than in Table 2.7 but not markedly — meaning that it is not common for a
student to win one lottery, turn that school down, and then enroll in another — but it
certainly does happen. None of the estimated impacts is significant, but the precision is
somewhat lower for this version of the impact of treatment on the treated.
Turning to postsecondary enrollment, Table 2.11 shows highly similar patterns
of statistical significance compared to the single Bloom (1984) adjustment. Again there
are significant effects for Choice on years enrolled in a two-year college one and four
years after graduation, and when pooling all three types of choice for impacts on years
enrolled four years after high school graduation. One newly significant effect is for VEEP,
where enrolling in any of the VEEP schools to which a student applied is significantly
negatively related to enrollment in a four-year college in the first year after completing
high school. However, the effect becomes insignificant when looking at years enrolled in
the first four years after high school.
Table 2.12 shows the impacts of enrolling in a choice program on our measures
of postsecondary degree and certificate attainment. With the exception of the impact of
enrolling in a magnet school on obtaining a two-year college degree or certificate within
four years of graduation, the patterns of statistical significance are identical to the results
in Table 2.9 from the impact of enrolling in the specific school to which one applied. The
most striking finding is that enrolling in a magnet school has a large negative impact on
the probability of obtaining a Bachelor’s degree within six years of graduating from high
school. There are positive impacts of enrolling in a VEEP school on obtaining a degree or
credential from a two-year college within four or five years, but again the effects dissipate
by year six.
61
2.4.5 Test for Variations in the Effect by School Characteristics
Schools vary dramatically in demographics and academics, and it may not be
sensible to assume that the impact of winning a lottery to one school should be the same
as for another school. The overall tenor of the intent-to-treat estimates is that winning
a lottery has no significant effect on high school and postsecondary outcomes, with a
few exceptions, typically indicating negative effects. It could be that there are significant
effects, positive or negative, for certain types of choice schools. For example, if a student
wins a lottery to attend a school having much higher value-added in test scores than the
local school, one could imagine enrolling in such a school could have a positive impact.
Indeed, Hastings, Kane and Staiger (2009) found, in one district, that school choice led
to test score gains for those applying to schools with higher average test scores.
Theoretically, what should matter for impacts are the differences in characteristics
between the school to which the student applied and the default local school which the
student might otherwise attend. Accordingly, we re-estimated the intent-to-treat models
after adding to equation (1) the difference in a given characteristic between the applied
versus local school, and an interaction of this difference with the dummy for winning the
lottery. We measure differences for the same 14 school characteristics discussed in the
earlier tables, covering measures of students’ average academic achievement, behavior,
and demographics.
We estimated these interactions after pooling all true lotteries across the three
types of school choice, and also separately by each program. We emphasize the pooled
results because we primarily seek patterns that are consistent across types of choice,
rather than idiosyncratic to just one choice program.
Table 2.13 summarizes the level of significance of the interactions, as well as
the sign of the interaction in cases where the interaction is significant at the five percent
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level. Panel A shows results for high school outcomes, with Panels B and C showing
results for postsecondary enrollment and postsecondary degree attainment. What is most
apparent across the three panels is how rarely interactions between winning a lottery and
differences in school characteristics are statistically significant. Further, when the impact
of winning a lottery changes with the gap in a given type of school trait, it is usually for
isolated outcomes.
We estimated these interaction models separately for the three school choice
programs as well. Results are not shown but are available on request. It was more
frequently the case that interactions were significant in these models but the patterns
varied across outcomes and types of school choice in ways that suggested at most
idiosyncratic effects. The percentage of interactions that were significant at the five
percent level were 6.3% for Magnet, 11.5% for Choice and 21.8% for VEEP. These
first two percentages are close to the type I error rate expected. VEEP was the outlier,
and had two outcomes that accounted for about half of the significant effects. These
two grade 12 outcomes — the percentage of days attended and citizenship grades —
showed significant positive interactions between winning the lottery and the differences
between the choice school and the local school in reading scores, math scores, reading
value-added, mean GPA, the proportion of students who were white and the proportion of
parents with a Bachelor’s or higher. While all of these relationships are easy to motivate,
for example in terms of positive peer effects, these patterns did not show up for other
high school or postsecondary outcomes, with a few exceptions.
2.4.6 Test for Variations in the Effect by Student Subgroup
It seems plausible that students from different subgroups could benefit differen-
tially from winning a lottery into a given choice program. For instance Deming et al.
(2014), in the only lottery-based study of the impact of open enrollment on postsecondary
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outcomes, found that girls benefited from school choice, but boys did not. It is crucial to
test for these interactions from a policy perspective. It could be the case that choice pro-
grams have no impact on many or even most students, but could lead to better outcomes
for some students, and potentially a Pareto improvement.
We tested for variations in the effects of school choice by student gender, race/
ethnicity, English Learner status, special education status, and parental education. Addi-
tionally we tested whether the grade to which a student applied was related to the impact.
Presumably, the earlier a student applies to the school choice programs the greater the
impact. (This logic follows because the choice programs allow students to articulate from
middle school to the high school in the same attendance area, or in the case of magnets,
to magnet high schools with a similar theme, if available. So applying to a middle school
choice program could offer a choice path all the way through high school graduation.)
Table 2.14 summarizes the interactions between these student characteristics and
winning a lottery for the pooled sample, using similar notation to that in Table 2.13.
The only difference in the way that we characterize significant interactions was that
when interactions were significant but the impact of winning a lottery did not increase
or decrease monotonically we indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels using **
and * respectively. (Non-monotonicity could arise for personal characteristics that were
measured not by binary or continuous variables but rather by a series of dummy variables.
Such was the case for the grade applied to, parental education and race/ethnicity.) The
top part of each panel shows interactions with the student’s own lagged achievement,
with the bottom panel showing various demographic characteristics along with English
Learner and special education status.
The three panels of Table 2.14 suggest that overall few personal characteristics
significantly mediated the impact of winning a lottery. The grade level for which students
applied was often significant, but rarely in a monotonic way. For example, the impact
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of winning a lottery was in some cases larger in grade 8 but smaller in grade 10, both
relative to the impact in grade 6.
2.5 Implications and Conclusion
The results suggest that on average granting a slot in a school of choice to a
student does not significantly alter his or her high school or postsecondary trajectories.
Some exceptions do emerge. Winning a lottery may shorten the time taken to obtain a
community college degree or certificate, but with no effect on the long run likelihood of
obtaining that degree or certificate. The only effect that may be lasting is that six years
after high school graduation, Magnet lottery winners may be less likely to have obtained
a Bachelor’s degree than lottery losers.
Policymakers should care about the intent-to-treat results because they speak
to the value of expanding a school choice program by offering one more spot. But
policymakers may care even more about the impact on a student of actually enrolling in
a school of choice. We estimated two types of impacts of treatment on the treated. Using
winning a lottery as an instrument, we estimated the impact of enrolling in the school
applied to, as well as that of enrolling in any school in the given program, such as the
Magnet program. Overall, the results were similar to the intent-to-treat estimates.
These results may mask larger impacts in specific cases. Theoretically, the bigger
the difference between a student’s default local school and the school to which she applies,
the bigger the impact of winning a lottery to attend the school of choice. We tested
whether the intent-to-treat effects varied by the difference between the two schools in
terms of achievement, student behavior and student demographics. Although on average
these inter-school differences were quite large, we typically did not find that any of these
differences mediated the impact of winning a lottery. The biggest exception was that
winning a VEEP lottery had bigger positive impacts on the two grade 12 behavioral
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outcomes — attendance and citizenship grades — if the VEEP school to which one
applied enrolled students with higher achievement and/or better behavior, or had a greater
share of white students.
Overall, these results do not suggest that school choice has generated meaningful
gains for students in San Diego. But this conclusion must be tempered for several
reasons. First, there could be other unmeasured outcomes on which students gain if
admitted to a choice program. Second, there could be larger effects, either positive or
negative, for specific types of students applying to specific types of schools. We hope to
study this in the future by looking for interactions between student background and the
difference in school characteristics between the local school and the school of choice.
Third, further robustness checks are planned. Among these planned extensions are checks
that differential attrition has not biased the results. Future extensions will likely include
estimation of another type of impact of treatment on the treated, which instruments for
the number of years attending a school of choice, and robustness checks to make sure
that substitution towards charter schools has not biased the results.
Chapter 2, in full, is an unpublished manuscript that contains the following co-
authors. Betts, Julian R.; Young, Sam M.; Zau, Andrew C.; Bachofer, Karen Volz. The
dissertation author was the primary investigator and author of this paper.
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2.6 Tables and Figures
Priority Description Who Is Admitted?
A Sibling All
B Specialized Course Some ←− True Lottery
C Before Priority Deadline None
D After Priority Deadline None
E Gifted Cluster None
Notes: For a given school and grade, applications are grouped in descending order by
the above priority groups. In this example, there are adequate seats to admit all students
applying from the Sibling priority group, A. Enough seats are then available to admit a
portion, but not all, of the students in group B. A true lottery occurs for group B, with only
those students with the lowest random numbers in the Specialized Course category being
admitted. No applications from groups C, D or E are then admitted, due to a lack of seats, in
this hypothetical example.
Figure 2.1. Simple Example of Lottery Admissions
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Figure 2.2. Priority Codes for Magnet, VEEP, and Choice Programs
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Table 2.1. Applications to True Lotteries, and Characteristics of Applicants
Magnet VEEP Choice Pooled
Number of Applications 7,140 3,810 3,415 14,365
Win That Lottery 0.46 0.69 0.43 0.51
Prior Math Score (Z) -0.13 -0.24 0.25 -0.07
Prior Reading Score (Z) -0.12 -0.32 0.31 -0.07
Male 0.47 0.5 0.47 0.48
Parent Ed ≥ Bachelor 0.21 0.11 0.40 0.23
White 0.12 0.04 0.35 0.15
Black 0.27 0.16 0.14 0.21
Asian 0.13 0.07 0.14 0.12
Hispanic 0.47 0.73 0.36 0.52
Notes: Apart from the number of applications and test scores, all other
rows refer to proportions of applications in which students had the given
characteristic. The sample consists of all applications to true lotteries for
admission in fall 2001 through fall 2007.
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Table 2.2. The Relationship Between Winning a Lottery and Student Characteristics
Magnet VEEP Choice Pooled
Prior Math Score 0.000 0.039 -0.073 -0.007
(0.026) (0.032) (0.051) (0.020)
Prior Reading Score 0.014 0.040 -0.032 0.010
(0.034) (0.037) (0.055) (0.024)
Presence of Lagged Scores 0.010 0.003 -0.015 0.001
(0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.006)
Male 0.010 -0.018 -0.014 -0.004
(0.019) (0.023) (0.017) (0.012)
Parent Ed ≥ Bachelor’s 0.004 0.013 0.026 0.012
(0.014) (0.015) (0.029) (0.011)
White 0.024 0.009 0.027 0.020*
(0.015) (0.010) (0.018) (0.009)
African-American -0.021 -0.008 -0.002 -0.013
(0.012) (0.018) (0.016) (0.008)
Hispanic 0.020 0.009 -0.016 0.008
(0.014) (0.023) (0.024) (0.011)
Asian/Pacific Islander -0.021 -0.007 -0.009 -0.014
(0.013) (0.011) (0.023) (0.009)
Left District After Lottery -0.004 -0.015 -0.029* -0.013*
(0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.006)
Notes: For each choice type, various student characteristics are used as outcomes
and regressed on a dummy for winning the lottery plus lottery fixed effects. This
table reports the coefficients on ‘win lottery’ from these regressions, along with
their standard errors. Results are informative of lottery fairness. Insignificant
results indicate that lottery winners and losers show no statistically significant
difference on the given characteristic. Robust standard errors are in parentheses,
clustered by lottery. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
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Table 2.3. Comparison of School Characteristics: Choice Program Schools Versus Local
Schools
Panel A: Magnet Schools
Mean at Mean Difference p-value
School Characteristic Applied School (Applied−Local) Difference = 0
Reading, Z-score 0.00 0.36 <0.00005
Math, Z-scorea -0.12 0.15 <0.00005
School Value-Added, Reading 0.00 0.04 <0.00005
School Value-Added, Matha -0.08 -0.05 <0.00005
Mean Grade Point Average 2.50 0.39 <0.00005
Proportion on Track in Grade 9 0.68 0.18 <0.00005
Proportion Graduating HS on Time 0.77 0.15 <0.00005
% Days Absent 5.24 -1.83 <0.00005
Mean Citizenship Grade 2.75 0.17 <0.00005
Proportion Students White 0.25 0.17 <0.00005
Proportion Students Black 0.21 0.02 <0.00005
Proportion Students Asian 0.14 -0.04 <0.00005
Proportion Students Hispanic 0.39 -0.15 <0.00005
Proportion Parent Ed ≥ Bachelor’s 0.21 0.09 <0.00005
Panel B: VEEP Schools
Mean at Mean Difference p-value
School Characteristic Applied School (Applied−Local) Difference = 0
Reading, Z-score 0.16 0.65 <0.00005
Math, Z-scorea 0.20 0.61 <0.00005
School Value-Added, Reading 0.00 0.04 <0.00005
School Value-Added, Matha 0.02 0.04 <0.00005
Mean Grade Point Average 2.63 0.54 <0.00005
Proportion on Track in Grade 9 0.66 0.20 <0.00005
Proportion Graduating HS on Time 0.79 0.21 <0.00005
% Days Absent 5.42 -1.76 <0.00005
Mean Citizenship Grade 2.96 0.46 <0.00005
Proportion Students White 0.37 0.31 <0.00005
Proportion Students Black 0.10 -0.08 <0.00005
Proportion Students Asian 0.13 0.01 0.0006
Proportion Students Hispanic 0.39 -0.25 <0.00005
Proportion Parent Ed ≥ Bachelor’s 0.29 0.19 <0.00005
a — Restricted to middle schools and grades 6–7
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Table 2.3. Comparison of School Characteristics: Choice Program Schools Versus Local
Schools, Continued
Panel C: Choice Schools
Mean at Mean Difference p-value
School Characteristic Applied School (Applied−Local) Difference = 0
Reading, Z-score 0.32 0.53 <0.00005
Math, Z-scorea 0.41 0.54 <0.00005
School Value-Added, Reading 0.01 0.03 <0.00005
School Value-Added, Matha 0.03 0.04 <0.00005
Mean Grade Point Average 2.72 0.42 <0.00005
Proportion on Track in Grade 9 0.72 0.16 <0.00005
Proportion Graduating HS on Time 0.82 0.14 <0.00005
% Days Absent 5.31 -1.13 <0.00005
Mean Citizenship Grade 3.03 0.32 <0.00005
Proportion Students White 0.42 0.22 <0.00005
Proportion Students Black 0.08 -0.07 <0.00005
Proportion Students Asian 0.13 -0.02 <0.00005
Proportion Students Hispanic 0.37 -0.14 <0.00005
Proportion Parent Ed ≥ Bachelor’s 0.37 0.23 <0.00005
Panel D: All Schools (Magnet, VEEP, and Choice)
Mean at Mean Difference p-value
School Characteristic Applied School (Applied−Local) Difference = 0
Reading, Z-score 0.12 0.48 <0.00005
Math, Z-scorea 0.09 0.40 <0.00005
School Value-Added, Reading 0.01 0.04 <0.00005
School Value-Added, Matha -0.03 0.04 0.0039
Mean Grade Point Average 2.59 0.44 <0.00005
Proportion on Track in Grade 9 0.69 0.18 <0.00005
Proportion Graduating HS on Time 0.79 0.16 <0.00005
% Days Absent 5.30 -1.64 <0.00005
Mean Citizenship Grade 2.87 0.28 <0.00005
Proportion Students White 0.32 0.22 <0.00005
Proportion Students Black 0.15 -0.03 <0.00005
Proportion Students Asian 0.14 -0.02 <0.00005
Proportion Students Hispanic 0.38 -0.17 <0.00005
Proportion Parent Ed ≥ Bachelor’s 0.27 0.15 <0.00005
a — Restricted to middle schools and grades 6–7
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Chapter 3
How Sensitive Are School Value-Added
Estimates to Methodology?
3.1 Introduction
The most readily available information on school performance comes in levels of
test scores. Yet levels of test scores do not necessarily identify how effective schools are,
as schools differ on many external factors over which they have little control — such as
students’ socioeconomic status or family attitudes toward schooling.
Rather than looking only at raw test scores, the effectiveness of schools is better
characterized by how well they perform given their students’ background and academic
histories. Toward this goal, there has been an increase in value-added modeling (VAM)
for both teachers and schools during the past 10–20 years, which measures effectiveness
based on within-student gains in achievement. And while many applications of school
accountability still rely on levels of performance, rather than value-added, this could
change in upcoming years as VAM continues to gain popularity.
But even with growing popularity, there is not a uniform standard for how to
conduct value-added modeling. This may sometimes affect results. In a real world
example, in 2010 the Los Angeles Times newspaper published a relative ranking of
local schools by value-added, based on research by Buddin (2010). About seven months
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later, the Los Angeles Unified School District provided its own estimates of schools’
value-added. Schools often did not rank similarly between the two analyses.1
If VAM becomes a key policy tool, it is essential to know whether its results are
sensitive to the methodology used. While there have been some attempts to investigate
this issue, most of these studies have looked at teacher value-added. It is unclear whether
their findings necessarily carry over to school value-added, since the issues that present
econometric challenges differ somewhat between the two cases. Thus, in this paper, we
estimate school value-added using a variety of models to examine sensitivity to both the
set of controls used and overall class of value-added model.
Our results indicate a modest sensitivity of value-added estimates to the control
specification, and a somewhat larger sensitivity to the overall class of value-added model
used. Correlations between individual model classes are heterogeneous, but in ways that
can largely be explained by the assumed degree of persistence in each model. We also
find the precision of estimates to be sensitive to the inclusion of school-level controls,
and whether researchers use panel instrument techniques to address dynamic panel bias.
Finally, we compare how well school value-added estimates correlate with
schools’ average levels of test score. We observe an interesting pattern that although
school-average levels show almost no correlation with school-average gains (when us-
ing minimal covariates), in most specifications value-added shows a moderate positive
correlation with average test score levels.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the relevant
literature, Section 3.3 summarizes the methods used, while Section 3.4 summarizes the
data used. Section 3.5 previews results, focusing on the relative precision of various
models, sensitivity of school rankings to covariates and model class, and comparing the
1Imberman and Lovenheim (2016) provide additional details about this example from Los Angeles.
Figure 1 in their appendix shows scatterplots of schools’ value-added estimates in the various analyses.
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value-added models to results from a naive analysis of test score levels, which is the
typical approach used in states’ accountability systems. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Value-Added Overview and Related Literature
This section provides a basic overview of VAM approaches to help motivate
the models that we assess. Equations are written for the context of school value-added,
though the patterns that we describe are also largely true of teacher value-added. We then
the review the segment of the literature that is most closely related to the current piece. A
more complete literature review can be found in Koedel, Mihaly and Rockoff (2015).
3.2.1 General Overview
VAM typically models students’ test score advancement over time while including
a set of school indicators as regressors. An example specification is
∆Sist = αs + ist, (3.1)
where ∆Sist denotes the one-year change in test score for student i at school s at time t,
and αs represents the value-added parameter for school s. This model is often referred to
as the “gain-score” model.
A second common class of value-added model takes the form
Sist = ρSis,t−1 + αs + ist, (3.2)
which we refer to as the “level-on-lag” model. Instead of using the change in score as
the outcome, this model regresses the level of test score on the lagged level, along with
school dummies and possibly covariates. This model is identical to the gain-score model
when ρ = 1, but is otherwise more general, since it allows ρ to take possibly different
values — as may be appropriate if past learning depreciates over time or otherwise does
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not carry over perfectly between years.2
Researchers sometimes differ on what covariates to include. While the preceding
equations are written without covariates, for simplicity, in practice these models often
feature an additional set of control variables, which varies in parsimony between studies.
For instance, the Tennessee Value-Added Assessment System (Sanders and Horn, 1994,
1998) advocates a parsimonious specification with few covariates — relying instead
on the gain structure of VAM to (implicitly) control for student background factors
through the prior test score. The argument is that, to the extent students do not sort
randomly to schools, inclusion of some variables like socioeconomic status may not
just capture the intended control effects, but may also proxy for school effectiveness.
When this is the case, part of a school’s actual effectiveness may attach to the control
variables instead, resulting in biased estimates of value-added. Nevertheless, many
researchers prefer to use explicit controls for student background and other factors during
VAM. The most common of these controls are basic student characteristics, such as
race and socioeconomic status, followed by aggregate characteristics at the school- or
classroom-level.
It is also common to see Equations 3.1 and 3.2 specified with or without student
fixed effects. We note, however, that the inclusion of student fixed effects may be
better-suited for teacher value-added settings (which to date have been the majority of
value-added studies) than school value-added settings. The reason is that, once student
fixed effects are included, identification of the value-added parameters comes only from
students who change teachers or schools. But whereas most students change teachers
from year to year, most students do not change schools between years, except at set
2In recent years, a majority of studies seem to favor the “level-on-lag” specification of Equation 3.2
over the “gain” specification of Equation 3.1 (Koedel, Mihaly and Rockoff, 2015). However, there remain
many earlier value-added studies that use the gain-score model.
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transitional grades (like going from middle school to high school).3 Student fixed effects
thus remove a large degree of variation in school value-added settings. This issue is
somewhat more innocuous in teacher value-added settings, but in both cases, the reduction
in variation may result in noisier estimates of key parameters.
This highlights a few other important differences between school value-added
and teacher value-added settings. While non-random sorting is a common issue to both,
it likely poses a greater danger in teacher value-added models because students are sorted
not only between schools, but also likely across classrooms due to ability grouping or
tracking. Limited sample size is also an issue in the teacher value-added literature, where
a given teacher may only be observed teaching a small number of students. Schools, on
the other hand, typically generate a larger average sample of students, but may still be
affected by size in a different manner, since schools themselves vary in size. Typically,
changes in average test scores tend to be more volatile for smaller schools (Chay, McEwan
and Urqiola, 2005; Kane and Staiger, 2002).
That the econometric pitfalls differ somewhat between the two cases is important,
given that the vast majority of the value-added literature has focused on teachers, rather
than schools. We revisit this issue toward the end of our literature review.
3.2.2 Similar Papers
Having described the basics of value-added, we next review the segment of the
literature that is most closely related to our paper. We focus on papers that estimate
value-added using a variety of model specifications and/or estimation techniques, with
the specific intent comparing their performance.
One subset of papers studies the impact of student demographic controls on
teacher value-added estimates. This has sometimes been a point of contention among
3In our data, roughly 80% of students attend only one elementary school. Moreover, the minority of
students who do change schools may be fundamentally dissimilar from the rest.
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researchers, due to the absence of covariates in the Tennessee Value-Added Assessment
System (TVAAS). Papers studying this issue have reached somewhat mixed conclusions.
Ballou, Sanders and Wright (2004) find that the inclusion of demographics controls
affects teacher value-added estimates under a simple fixed effects estimator, but not under
the TVAAS.4 McCaffrey et al. (2004), meanwhile, use a simulation approach and find
that the sensitivity to covariates is lower when students sort homogeneously students sort
to teachers and schools, on these observed characteristics.
A second group of papers considers more general variations in the model specifi-
cation, often changing both the set of covariates and overall class of value-added model.
We highlight three papers in this group: Lockwood et al. (2007), Newton et al. (2010),
and Tekwe et al. (2004).
These papers perform similar exercises, though the first two focus on teacher
value-added, while the third focuses, like we do, on school value-added. These papers
estimate value-added using a variety of specifications and/or estimation techniques,
before computing correlations of how well these estimates align across cases. Lockwood
et al. (2007) use the most extensive menu of models — featuring 5 sets of covariates and
4 classes of models, for 20 specifications total — to study the sensitivity of teacher value-
added estimates. They find generally high correlations across models when changing
either covariates, model class, or both. Newton et al. (2010) use a somewhat smaller
array of models, but find similar results. Both of these preceding papers suggest only
a mild degree of sensitivity to the model specification.5 However, this is not the case
4Ballou, Sanders and Wright (2004) argue that, in practice, the importance of covariates may depend on
how fully a model makes use of the information contained in students’ test scores. The more information
about a student’s academic traejectory that a model gleans from test scores themselves (perhaps by
using covariances between scores in different subjects and years, like in the TVAAS), the less additional
information is gained by covariates, which would otherwise proxy for similar information — and the less
the results change.
5These authors do not, however, conclude that value-added estimates are universally robust to method-
ology. Model specification aside, Lockwood et al. (2007) highlight sensitivity to using different math
achievement measures, while Newton et al. (2010) highlight temporal instability of teacher value-added
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for Tekwe et al. (2004), who study school value-added, and find results sensitive to the
inclusion of student-level covariates. In their paper, school value-added estimates from
the model with student controls show the lowest correlations with all the other models.
This is especially true for third grade math, where the correlation with estimates from
other models is typically around 0.6.
(We note that in this last finding, Tekwe et al. (2004) introduce covariates only at
the same time as a change in the overall structure of the value-added model, making it
unclear what role each respective component plays. But the end finding of sensitivity still
differs from the earlier papers. Our paper extends upon Tekwe et al. (2004) by separately
exploring sensitivity to covariates and to the class of value-added model.)
Sass, Semykina and Harris (2014) is another similar paper that estimates teacher
value-added using a variety of models. Their paper initially focuses on testing the under-
lying assumptions of value-added, which they typically reject, before also comparing the
similarity of estimates across models.6 They do so in two ways: (1) reporting how often
the same teacher is estimated as being in the top 10% or bottom 10% across separate
models, and (2) computing rank correlations of the teacher value-added coefficients
across models. Doing so, they find a wide range in the similarity of estimates across
models. While some models give similar results to others, other combinations give very
different estimates of teacher value-added. The presence of student fixed effects, in
particular, seems to make a big difference. While estimates from models without student
fixed effects tend to show high correlations with those of other models without student
fixed effects, this often is not the case when comparing two models that both have student
fixed effects, or when comparing a model with student fixed effects to one without. The
authors comment that this may be due to the reduction in variation that comes from using
estimates, and that teachers can have different value-added by course taught.
6See Todd and Wolpin (2003) for an excellent primer on value-added that motivates and explains the
underlying assumptions.
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student fixed effects, which results in noisier estimates.
Guarino, Reckase and Wooldridge (2015) use a simulation approach to assess
the performance of various teacher value-added models and estimation techniques while
setting the data-generating process. Their simulations consider multiple variations for
how students are assigned to teachers (not always randomly), the degree of persistence
between years (ρ), and whether teacher effects themselves are large or small. They then
assess the performance of each model/estimation approach under each of the different
scenarios. Unlike the other papers mentioned, they do not compare the similarity of value-
added estimates from each estimation approach against those of the other approaches, but
against the underlying truth that they specify. Unsurprisingly, they find some methods
of estimating value-added to be more reliable at capturing actual teacher effectiveness
than others, across the various data-generating scenarios. What is more surprising is
that ordinary least squares (while controlling for lagged test score level) appears to be
the best overall performer — outperforming several alternatives that offer theoretical
improvements based on structural considerations.
A final similar paper comes from Andrabi, Das, Khwaja and Zajonc (2011). This
paper estimates school value-added using a variety of models, but differs from the others
in that it does not estimate value-added for individual schools. Instead, it estimates a
single treatment effect for attending a private school, cast in a value-added framework.
This paper is useful for its analysis of dynamic panel bias in the context of value-added.
Using both OLS and dynamic panel estimators (e.g. the Arellano-Bond (1991) estimator)
for a level-on-lag equation, these authors find that OLS gives upward-biased estimates of
the persistence parameter, ρ, but often still gives similar value-added estimates as the
more data-intensive dynamic panel methods. In contrast, the gain-score model, which
imposes ρ = 1, seems to give downward-biased estimates of value-added.
To recap, there have been somewhat mixed findings from the literature about the
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sensitivity of value-added estimates to the methodology — with some papers reporting
higher degrees of sensitivity to covariates and/or model class than others. Further
complicating matters is the fact that most of these papers have studied teacher value-
added, and not school value-added. Among the papers in our literature review, only
Tekwe et al. (2004) and Andrabi et al. (2011) study school value-added. Due to some
differences in the econometric challenges between the two cases, it is unclear which
results also apply to school value-added.
3.3 Methods
This paper features a menu of nine (9) value-added models, consisting of three
model classes and three sets of covariate specifications each. Our main analysis estimates
value-added using these nine specifications, before computing correlations across models
to see how sensitive results are to methodology. We then explore a number of extensions,
described in the Results.
Our three classes of value-added models are listed below:
∆Sigst = αs + γg + γt + x
′
igstβ + igst (3.3)
Sigst = ρSigs,t−1 + αs + γg + γt + x′igstβ + igst (3.4)
∆Sigst = ρ∆Sigs,t−1 + αs∆1{school s}+ γg∆1{grade g} (3.5)
+ γt∆1{year t}+ ∆x′igstβ + ∆igst
where Sigst denotes the standardized test score of student i in grade g at school s at time
t; ∆Sigst denotes the one-year change in test score; (αs, γg, γt) denote school, grade, and
year fixed effects respectively; x′igst denotes a vector of other control variables; and igst
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denotes an error term.
Equations 3.3 and 3.4 correspond to the gain and level-on-lag models introduced
previously. These equations are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). Equation
3.5 is a transformed version of the level-on-lag model, in first difference, that allows for
and sweeps out a student fixed effect. We use the xtabond2 command in Stata (Roodman,
2009) to estimate this equation using an Arellano-Bond (1991) estimator that instruments
the change in lagged test score, as well as the changes in the school dummies (which we
treat as endogenous) using lags of the data. Additional details about how we perform this
estimation are provided in the appendix. All three equations cluster standard errors by
school.
The Arellano-Bond estimator helps address the issue of dynamic panel bias
(Nickell, 1981), which arises in equations featuring both student fixed effects and lagged
dependent variables as regressors. An undesired result is that, if left unchecked, this
may prevent our uninstrumented level-on-lag model from returning consistent estimates.7
Interestingly, this issue is only sometimes addressed by the existing value-added litera-
ture.8 But while the Arellano-Bond model offers plausible improvements on consistency,
it comes with its own downsides and tradeoffs. One is that it makes much heavier
demands of the data, requiring lags to use as instruments. It also only obtains variation
for identifying school value-added coefficients from students who change schools, which
in our data is about one-fifth of the students. We discuss these issues in more detail when
presenting results.
7The key issue is that in short (small T ) panels, any unmodeled shocks affect the estimated value of the
fixed effect, creating a correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the error term. Additional
details are provided in the appendix.
8Some example papers that use panel instrument methods include Andrabi et al. (2011), Guarino,
Reckase and Wooldridge (2015), and Sass, Semykina and Harris (2014). Many other papers seem to ignore
or overlook issue.
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Within each model class, we also feature three different specifications of controls:
Control Specification A: school, grade, and year fixed effects
Control Specification B: specification A + student characteristics
Control Specification C: specification B + school demographics
where the exact variables that comprise ‘student characteristics’ and ‘school demograph-
ics’ are listed in Table 3.1. These specifications are chosen to mirror the value-added
literature, where student characteristics are the most commonly used controls, and school
demographics are the next most common.
3.4 Data
To estimate these value-added models, we use data from San Diego Unified
School District spanning a five-year period from the 2006-07 to 2010-11 school years.
The dataset records detailed information at the student-year level, and tracks these
students over time to form a panel.
Key variables include a student’s grade and primary school attended each year,
race, parental education, English learner status, special education status, and school-level
demographics. Student achievement is measured using scores on the California Standards
Test (CST) in Math and English Language Arts (henceforth ‘Reading’), which we convert
to Z-scores relative to the state mean and standard deviation, for the respective year and
grade level. CST scores are available from grade 2 onward, when standardized testing
begins. These tests are administered each year in the spring, toward the end of the school
year.
Although the district records these data for students of all grade levels, for
tractability reasons, we restrict our analysis to students in elementary schools.9 Keeping
9A key issue for secondary grades is that not all students take the same CST Math test, even within
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only cases with available outcomes, we have a total of 162,921 student-year observations,
comprised of 77,647 unique students across 120 elementary schools.10 Table 3.1 provides
summary statistics for this group of students.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Distribution of Value-Added Coefficients and Their Precision
Before showing correlations of estimates across specifications, we first examine
basic patterns in the distribution of school coefficients and their standard errors, as this
information may help inform some of the later results. Table 3.2 provides summary
information (mean and standard deviation) about the estimated value-added coefficients
and their standard errors, under each specification.
Looking first at the standard error columns, two patterns can be clearly seen.
The first pattern is that, within any class of model, standard errors are much larger
under control specification C, which introduces school-level demographics, than either
control specifications A or B. The most likely explanation seems to be collinearity
between the school demographic variables and the school fixed effects. Values of school
demographics, such as the percentage of African-American students, typically do not drift
much during the 5-year period that we study, such that there is not much within-school
variation for these variables. Standard errors increase dramatically when the model
nevertheless attempt to estimate coefficients for these variables in addition to school fixed
effects.
The second pattern is that the Arellano-Bond model gives much larger standard
errors than either the gain-score model or uninstrumented level-on-lag model. This pattern
a given grade. This makes it difficult to define a school’s overall value-added for Math. Students in
elementary grades, meanwhile, all take the same Math CST test, such that this issue does not apply.
10We ultimately omit six elementary schools with only a few students during this time. These omitted
schools typically have fewer than 10 gain-scores available, where ∆Sigst is well-defined, in either subject.
Of the remaining 114 schools, the average number of gain-scores is about 720 in each subject.
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is not entirely surprising, since the Arellano-Bond (1991) estimator first-differences the
data, meaning that school coefficients are identified by the subset of students who switch
schools — only about one-fifth of students. This is a major limitation of this approach.
Precision is also be affected by the use of an instrumental variables procedure.
Both of these patterns on standard errors also carry over to the coefficient es-
timates. Looking at the coefficient columns in Table 3.2, coefficients themselves are
also most widely dispersed under control specification C (for any class of model), and
more widely dispersed under the Arellano-Bond model than either the gain-score or
level-on-lag model. This has systematic effects on any resulting correlations. Other
things the same, we typically expect lower correlations for less precise estimates.
One way to mitigate this issue is to apply shrinkage, or adjust schools’ value-
added estimates toward the baseline average, depending on their precision. This is a
common, though not universal, practice in the value-added literature.11 Following Morris
(1983), we use a shrinkage estimator of the form
αˆshrunks =
(
σˆ2
σˆ2 + Vs
)
αˆs +
(
1− σˆ
2
σˆ2 + Vs
)
α¯,
where σˆ2 denotes the sample variance of the estimated school coefficients, Vs denotes
the variance of school s′s coefficient estimate, and α¯ denotes the overall average of the
school value-added coefficients, for the given specification. The more noisily that αˆs is
estimated, the more weight is given to the baseline average, rather than the unadjusted
estimate, and vice versa.
The effects of shrinkage can be seen in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, which show his-
tograms of the value-added coefficients for Math and Reading respectively, for both
11Among non-economist researchers, value-added models are often estimated using hierarchical linear
modeling (HLM) or empirical Bayes estimators, which intrinsically “shrink” a school’s value-added
parameter toward the baseline average, depending on its precision. Economists, on the other hand, typically
do not use HLM as the initial estimation technique, but sometimes achieve a similar shrinkage effect after
the fact. See, for example, Chetty, Friedman and Rockoff (2014) and Lefgren and Sims (2012).
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shrunk and unshrunk cases. For many specifications, the shrunk estimates are nearly
identical to their unshrunk counterparts. But shrinkage has a pronounced impact on speci-
fications with larger baseline standard errors — specifically anything that uses control set
C or the Arellano-Bond (1991) estimator. In these cases, the shrunk coefficients typically
still have a similar mean as the unshrunk case, but are much more tightly packed around
this mean.
In a few cases, the shrunk estimates also exhibit more skewness than the unshrunk
estimates. (See, for example, the gain-score model and level-on-lag model for Reading
under control specification C.) However, we believe these to be idiosyncratic to our
results in those particular specifications, and not a general property of the shrinkage
estimator.12
3.5.2 Sensitivity to Covariates and Model Class
We use three ways of showing the sensitivity of estimates across value-added
models: (1) showing correlations between the various specifications; (2) showing scatter-
plots of school coefficients; and (3) showing transition matrices for how schools’ quintile
rankings compare under different specifications. For each of these three cases, tables
and figures in the main text use unshrunk estimates throughout, though we discuss the
effects of shrinkage and provide analogous tables/figures using shrunk estimates in the
appendix.
Table 3.3 begins by showing Spearman rank correlations of value-added estimates
across control specifications for each of the three classes of value-added models that
we use.13 We henceforth refer to these as “cross-control” correlations, while correla-
12Imprecise estimates (or those most affected by shrinkage) are somewhat more likely to be in the left
or right tails of the initial unshrunk distribution, since the imprecision of these estimates helps them take
more extreme values. Skewness may result after shrinkage if, for some reason, a disproportionate share of
these imprecise values come from the right tail rather than the left, or vice versa.
13We use Spearman rather than Pearson correlations because in practice the main policy use of the school
coefficients is to rank schools. When using Pearson correlations instead (results available upon request),
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tions across model classes, for a given set of controls, are called ”cross-model class”
correlations.
We generally find only a mild degree of sensitivity to the covariates used. One
exception is that the gain-score model appears somewhat sensitive to the use of school-
level demographics — where estimated coefficients from models that include these
variables show rank correlations of 0.52–0.64 compared to other versions of the gain-
score model. But cross-control correlations are otherwise generally above 0.7 in all three
models, for both Math and Reading. The overall average correlation when changing
covariates alone is about 0.781 in Table 3.3.14
Table 3.4, meanwhile, shows rank correlations of value-added estimates across
model classes for each of control specifications A, B, and C. As a whole, these correlations
are considerably lower than those seen in Table 3.3, suggesting that value-added estimates
are much more sensitive to the overall class of model than to the control specification.
Strikingly, correlations between the gain-score model and the Arellano-Bond model are
as low as about 0.1 for both Math and Reading, under control specification A. As an
overall average, the average across-model class correlation is about 0.501 in Table 3.4,
but with substantial heterogeneity between model classes.
The value of the autoregressive parameter, ρ, may explain much of the patterns
observed between model classes. Whereas the gain-score model imposes ρ = 1, both
versions of the level-on-lag model estimate ρ to be significantly lower. In our data, the
uninstrumented level-on-lag model typically estimates ρˆ ≈ 0.7, while the Arellano-Bond
model estimates ρˆ ≈ 0.25, for both Math and Reading. This ordering for the perceived
value of ρ is consistent with the correlations between model classes. Specifically, we see
cross-control correlations are slightly higher than those displayed, while cross-model class correlations are
slightly lower, on average.
14This calculation reports a simple average of the non-trivial correlations in Table 3.3, averaged across
both subjects (Reading and Math) and all three panels. Subsequent calculations are performed similarly.
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that the gain-score model and Arellano-Bond model show the lowest correlation with one
another under any control specification (and about 0.222 on average within Table 3.4),
while the uninstrumented level-on-lag model shows at least moderate correlation with
either of the others (0.741 with the gain-score model, and 0.540 with the Arellano-Bond
model when averaging across Table 3.4).
It is also plausible that imprecision may affect these correlations to a degree.
Other things the same, less precise estimates typically give lower correlation values, and
we have seen some specifications have systematically larger standard errors than others.
We thus check how shrinkage affects the observed correlations.
Tables A13 and A14 of the appendix show cross-control and cross-model correla-
tions using the shrunk coefficients instead. By and large, these correlations are similar
to their values in the unshrunk case. Rank correlations across control specifications
remain right around 0.78, on average, using the shrunk coefficients. Across-model class
correlations increase slightly to about 0.514 on average, though we see both increases
and decreases in the degree to which the Arellano-Bond model (which generates the least
precise estimates) correlates with the others. So although we have seen that shrinkage
(sometimes) has a pronounced effect on the distribution of coefficient estimates, rank
correlations do not change much as a result.
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 next show scatterplots for Math and Reading respectively.
Each scatterplot shows school coefficient estimates from one class of model on the X-axis,
plotted against school coefficients from another class of model on the Y-axis, for the
same set of covariates. Plots are arranged so that each row compares the same two classes
of model throughout, while the columns show results under control specifications A, B,
and C respectively.
These scatterplots make it easy to see any nonlinearities or outliers, which may
affect how to view the earlier correlations. For our data, we do not observe any major
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nonlinearities worth noting. However, do we observe a few outliers, especially with the
Arellano-Bond model. These outliers are somewhat less pronounced after shrinkage
(see Figures A2 and A3 in the appendix), but as noted, rank correlations do not change
drastically.
Another pattern that stands out in these scatterplots is that the results of the
gain-score model and level-on-lag model become increasingly similar as the number of
controls increases. In the top row of either Figure 3.3 or 3.4, the scatterplots become
much closer to a straight line as one proceeds rightward across columns. This, however,
does not appear to be a general pattern for the other model classes.
Our final way of presenting these results is to show how often a school’s relative
ranking changes depending on the specification used. This is more than just a statistical
exercise, as school districts sometimes target additional resources to bottom-performing
schools based on their percentile ranking. (For example, San Diego Unified School
District at one point targeted additional resources to elementary schools whose average
test scores ranked within the bottom two deciles of the state as a whole.)
To do this, we rank schools in quintiles based on their value-added coefficients,
under various specifications, and generate “transition matrices” for how these quintiles
compare. Tables 3.5–3.6 display results in this format, comparing each of the three
model classes that we use, for control specification B. In both tables, the top panel
compares rankings under the gain-score model against those of the level-on-lag model;
the middle panel compares rankings under the gain-score model against those of the
Arellano-Bond model; and the bottom panel compares rankings under the level-on-lag
model against those of the Arellano-Bond model. In all cases, the diagonal elements of
each matrix show how often schools remain in the same quintile, across the two models,
while off-diagonal elements show how often schools change quintiles.
Our interest in these tables is seeing what percentage of the time schools take (at
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least roughly) the same relative ranking across models. To facilitate this task, all panels
report the sum of diagonal entries in the upper left hand corner (just outside the transition
matrix itself). Looking at these values, it can be seen that these rates are far from 100
percent, as would be the case if rankings remained unchanged between models. In even
the “closest” pairing, which for both subjects is the gain-score model and the level-on-lag
model, schools change quintiles slightly over half the time. Meanwhile, schools change
quintiles as much as 75–80 percent of the time when comparing the least similar models
(the gain-score model and the Arellano-Bond model, for both subjects).
We next consider how shrinkage affects these results. Tables A15 and A16 show
analogous transition matrices using the shrunk value-added estimates. Overall, we find a
similar picture as occurs in the unshrunk case. Because the gain-score and level-on-lag
school coefficients are estimated fairly precisely, the school quintile assignments are
virtually the same in these two models. Where shrinkage matters, for control specification
B, is in the Arellano-Bond model. But even after shrinkage, schools’ quintile rankings
continue to differ between this model and the others at generally similar rates as before.15
Altogether, shrinkage appears to do little to resolve the variability of schools’ rankings
between models.
3.5.3 Correlations Between Value-Added and Level of Test Score
Much of the motivation behind VAM stems from the idea that levels of test score
alone do not necessarily convey school effectiveness, due to differences in students’
socioeconomic status (e.g.) or other factors that have little to do with the schools
themselves. Yet raw test scores are very readily available to the public, and moreover,
many aspects of school accountability continue to rely on levels of test score rather than
15Consider the bottom panels of Tables A15–A16, which compare the level-on-lag and Arellano-Bond
results. For Math, the sum of schools on the diagonals, representing schools that stay in the same quintile,
is 36.8 percent with the unshrunk estimates and 37.8 percent with the shrunk estimates. For Reading, the
percentage of schools on the diagonals is 35.1 and 38.6 in the unshrunk and shrunk cases respectively.
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value-added. For example, the federal No Child Left Behind (NCLB) law, which was in
place from 2002 until its replacement in 2015, required states that received federal aid
for K-12 education to test students in specified grades and subject areas. Schools that
had lower than required percentages of students proficient for more than two years in a
row (overall or for student subgroups) were subject to an escalating set of accountability
sanctions. This approach did not take into account students’ past test scores, and thus
had the potential to produce misleading pictures of school effectiveness.
With this being the case, the empirical degree to which value-added aligns with
test score levels is a crucial policy question. To explore this question, we estimate an
additional model of the form
Sigst = α
L
s + γ
L
g + γ
L
t + 
L
igst. (3.6)
This equation is not a value-added model, since it does not control for past achievement.
Instead, it is a deliberately “naive” levels model, such that the αˆLs coefficients essentially
just rate schools by their average level of test scores.
Table 3.7 reports correlations between the results of this naive levels model and
value-added coefficients from each of the earlier specifications. One interesting pattern is
that, prior to the use of school-level controls, in covariate specifications A and B the the
gain-score model shows very little correlation with school coefficients from the naive
levels model, for either Math or Reading. In most other specifications, value-added shows
a moderate correlation with the naive levels model: between 0.20–0.76 for Math, and
0.45–0.86 for Reading.
Earlier, we described that ρ, the value of the autoregressive parameter, was able
to explain many of the correlation patterns between model classes. It is worth revisiting
this issue in the context of the naive levels model.
Notice that the levels model is equivalent to the level-on-lag model when ρ = 0.
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In contrast, the gain-score model assumes ρ = 1, the empirical (uninstrumented) level-
on-lag model estimates ρ to be about 0.7, and the Arellano-Bond model estimates ρ to
be about 0.25, for both subjects. In this light, there is a natural ordering between the
naive model and each of the value-added models. If ρ is the only key difference between
these models, then we should generally expect the naive levels model to show the highest
correlation with the Arellano-Bond model, followed by the level-on-lag model, and
finally the lowest correlation with the gain model.
The pattern does not hold in Table 3.7, but comes fairly close. The naive model
actually shows the highest correlation with the level-on-lag model, rather than the
Arellano-Bond model (although the Arellano-Bond model still shows a higher correlation
than does the gain-score model). This discrepancy likely reflects the fact the Arellano-
Bond estimator differs in two other important ways from the naive model: it instruments
the changes in lagged test score and the school dummies, and it also identifies school
coefficients from the subsample of students who switch elementary schools.
3.6 Discussion
This paper uses data from San Diego Unified School District to examine the
sensitivity of school value-added estimates to both the control specification and overall
class of value-added model. We consider three classes of value-added models — a
gain-score model, a level-on-lag model, and an Arellano-Bond model that allows for a
student fixed or random effect — and three control specifications each, for a total of nine
specifications.
Overall, we find a relatively mild sensitivity of results to the control specifica-
tion, and a somewhat greater sensitivity to the class of value-added model. Precision
of estimates appears sensitive to the inclusion of school-level controls, and whether
researchers use panel instrument techniques to address dynamic panel bias. Value-added
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estimates also typically show a moderate positive correlation with schools’ average level
of test scores. We recap these results in greater detail below, while offering additional
commentary. While we note that a study based on any one set of schools and testing
system cannot yield definitive best practices, some tentative conclusions about preferred
approaches do emerge.
An important subsidiary goal of the paper has been to compare how school
rankings based on value-added compare with rankings based on average levels of test
scores.16 In most cases, we find a moderate positive correlation between the two. There
are both optimistic and pessimistic ways to view this result. On one hand, it may be a
reassuring sign that, at least on average, schools with higher average achievement also
appear to have higher value-added. On the other hand, our analysis using transition
matrices suggests that even models that show a correlation of about 0.7 with one another
can rank schools in different quintiles over half the time. We thus take a somewhat more
pessimistic view on this issue, that although the common practice among policymakers
of ranking schools by test score levels is expedient, it is unlikely to be accurate of what
these rankings are often intended to capture. Thus, the naive method of ranking schools
by test scores, as the U.S. federal government required states to do for a dozen years, is
unlikely to produce unbiased estimates of school effectiveness, and should probably be
avoided.
This still leaves us with nine value-added models. Our results indicate a modest
sensitivity of value-added estimates to the control specification. With an exception that
the gain-score model appears somewhat sensitive to the use of school-level controls, we
generally find correlations of 0.7 or higher across covariate specifications. Sensitivity to
16The latter case is a restricted version of value-added models in which ρ = 0. Such a restriction is
strongly rejected by the data. In all of our regressions that use a level-on-lag format, whether instrumented
or not, the estimated value of ρ can be statistically distinguished from both 0 and 1 at all conventional
significance levels. P -values are below 0.001 in all cases.
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the overall class of value-added model appears somewhat larger. For the models that we
consider, the average correlation across model classes (while holding covariates fixed)
is about 0.5 — albeit with substantial heterogeneity. Results of the gain-score model
and Arellano-Bond model tend to show low correlation with one another, perhaps due to
differences in the supposed degree of persistence (ρ), while the level-on-lag model shows
moderate correlation with either of the others.
With the less-than-perfect agreement across the nine specifications, analysis of the
results leads to tentative suggestions about how to narrow down the sorts of models one
should estimate. The gain-score model assumes that ρ is exactly one. This assumption
is strongly rejected by the data, as has been the case for some other researchers as
well. Thus, the level-on-lag model (estimated by OLS) or the Arellano-Bond model
(which allows for student fixed effects) are likely the most promising approaches for
estimating school value-added. Due to concerns about lowered precision when one
controls for school demographics, however, researchers attempting to estimate school
effectiveness should exercise caution in using school-level controls. Thus, a tentative
suggestion is to narrow our nine candidate specifications to four: the level-on-lag and
Arellano-Bond estimators, with control specification A, which controls for school, grade
and year fixed effects, or control specification B, which additionally controls for student’s
own demographics.
The Arellano-Bond model has the attractive property of potentially delivering
more consistent estimates, due to its ability to address both individual heterogeneity and
the related dynamic panel bias, but at the cost of dramatically lower precision. Thus the
choice between the two models is not entirely clear, and provides yet another illustration
of the trade-off between estimators on bias versus precision. Either of these methods,
though, is likely to yield a more accurate picture of underlying rates of learning than
naive levels models frequently used by governments or the gain-score approach that has
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been widely used by researchers in the recent past.
But even after having whittled nine candidate value-added models down to four,
we note that school rankings are highly sensitive to the method. For instance, using
control specification B, we showed that if we rank schools into quintiles based on their
estimated effectiveness using the Arellano-Bond approach, of the 20 percent of schools
in the lowest quintile (for Math), only 7.9 percent — well under half — are also in
the bottom quintile of schools according to the level-on-lag model. Perhaps the main
lesson from the analysis is that the choice among even the most reasonable models can
have dramatic effects on school rankings. Identifying bottom-performing schools for
interventions remains a very difficult task, subject to considerable uncertainty.
Chapter 3, in full, is an unpublished manuscript that contains the following
co-authors. Betts, Julian R.; Young, Sam M. The dissertation author was the primary
investigator and author of this paper.
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3.7 Tables and Figures
Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max
Outcomes:
Math CST Score (Z) 162,569 0.03 1.01 -4.79 3.72
English Language Arts CST Score (Z) 162,754 0.06 1.05 -6.40 4.85
Student Characteristics:
Female 162,921 0.49 0.50 0 1
African-American 162,921 0.12 0.33 0 1
Hispanic 162,921 0.45 0.50 0 1
Asian/Pacific Islander 162,921 0.17 0.37 0 1
Other/Unknown Race 162,921 0.01 0.10 0 1
Parent Ed. < High School Diploma 162,921 0.12 0.32 0 1
Parent Ed. = High School Diploma 162,921 0.19 0.39 0 1
Parent Ed. = Some College 162,921 0.19 0.39 0 1
Parent Ed. = College Degree 162,921 0.16 0.36 0 1
Parent Ed. = Post-Graduate 162,921 0.10 0.30 0 1
Parent Ed. = Missing/Unknown 162,921 0.24 0.43 0 1
English Learner† 162,921 0.42 0.49 0 1
Fluent English Proficient† 162,921 0.00 0.04 0 1
Special Education† 162,921 0.10 0.30 0 1
School Demographics:
% Students on Free or Reduced Priced Lunch 162,921 63.66 32.00 0 100
% African-American 162,921 12.52 11.26 0 90.21
% Hispanic 162,921 44.54 26.28 0 100
% Asian/Pacific Islander 162,921 16.38 13.50 0 54.86
% Other/Unknown Race 162,921 1.17 1.42 0 33.33
% English Learner† 162,921 41.41 24.72 0 100
% Fluent English Proficient† 162,921 0.15 0.31 0 2.97
Notes: Each observation corresponds to a student-year. Statistics are calculated for elementary school
students with either Math or English Language Arts (ELA) score observed on the California Standards
Test (CST) in a given year. Math and ELA scores are in standard deviation units relative to the state
mean in the given year, for the student’s respective grade level. Variables marked with dagger (†)
are based on students’ status in their first appearance in the district. We use first appearance status
since subsequent status may be endogenous to school effectiveness. The dummy for white student (≈
25%), dummy for native English speaker (≈ 57%), school percentage white, and school percentage
of native English speakers are omitted to avoid collinearity.
110
Table 3.2. Summary Information About Coefficients and Standard Errors, Before Shrink-
age
Coefficients Standard Errors
Math Reading Math Reading
Gain, Control A -0.001 0.030 0.020 0.014
(0.118) (0.076) (0.0017) (0.0013)
Gain, Control B -0.048 0.017 0.021 0.016
(0.117) (0.076) (0.0017) (0.0012)
Gain, Control C -0.268 -0.245 0.367 0.305
(0.172) (0.131) (0.1240) (0.0956)
Level-on-Lag, Control A -0.000 0.042 0.017 0.013
(0.147) (0.131) (0.0015) (0.0011)
Level-on-Lag, Control B 0.113 0.164 0.019 0.015
(0.127) (0.095) (0.0021) (0.0015)
Level-on-Lag, Control C -0.044 0.015 0.322 0.299
(0.193) (0.138) (0.1079) (0.0935)
Arellano-Bond, Control A -0.027 0.035 0.257 0.246
(0.435) (0.418) (0.1714) (0.1492)
Arellano-Bond, Control B -0.067 0.017 0.250 0.231
(0.615) (0.543) (0.1747) (0.1278)
Arellano-Bond, Control C -0.050 0.030 0.472 0.418
(0.563) (0.478) (0.1448) (0.1115)
Notes: Table reports the mean and standard deviation of school value-added co-
efficients and their standard errors, prior to shrinkage. Standard deviations are in
parentheses.
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Table 3.3. Spearman Rank Correlations of Value-Added Coefficients Across Control
Specifications
Gain Model
Math Reading
Control A Control B Control C Control A Control B Control C
Control A 1 Control A 1
Control B 0.993 1 Control B 0.994 1
Control C 0.523 0.569 1 Control C 0.613 0.635 1
Level-on-Lag Model
Math Reading
Control A Control B Control C Control A Control B Control C
Control A 1 Control A 1
Control B 0.938 1 Control B 0.946 1
Control C 0.881 0.765 1 Control C 0.913 0.856 1
Arellano-Bond Model
Math Reading
Control A Control B Control C Control A Control B Control C
Control A 1 Control A 1
Control B 0.815 1 Control B 0.829 1
Control C 0.514 0.786 1 Control C 0.704 0.786 1
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Table 3.4. Spearman Rank Correlations of Value-Added Coefficients Across Model
Classes
Covariate Specification A
Math Reading
Gain LevLag ABond Gain LevLag ABond
Gain 1 Gain 1
LevLag 0.599 1 LevLag 0.529 1
ABond 0.112 0.570 1 ABond 0.075 0.613 1
Covariate Specification B
Math Reading
Gain LevLag ABond Gain LevLag ABond
Gain 1 Gain 1
LevLag 0.761 1 LevLag 0.684 1
ABond 0.302 0.571 1 ABond 0.169 0.546 1
Covariate Specification C
Math Reading
Gain LevLag ABond Gain LevLag ABond
Gain 1 Gain 1
LevLag 0.932 1 LevLag 0.940 1
ABond 0.231 0.351 1 ABond 0.441 0.586 1
113
Table 3.5. Relative Ranking of Schools, Compared Across Models, for Math
Gain vs. Level-on-Lag
Sum Diagonal ≈ 46.5% Gain Model
1st Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile 5th Quintile
Level-on-
Lag
Model
1st Quintile 13.2 5.3 0.9 0.9 0
2nd Quintile 4.4 7.9 5.3 1.8 0.9
3rd Quintile 1.8 4.4 5.3 7.9 0.9
4th Quintile 0 1.8 8.8 6.1 3.5
5th Quintile 0.9 0.9 0 3.5 14.0
Gain vs. Arellano-Bond
Sum Diagonal ≈ 23.6% Gain Model
1st Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile 5th Quintile
Arellano-
Bond
Model
1st Quintile 4.4 5.3 3.5 4.4 2.6
2nd Quintile 6.1 6.1 4.4 2.6 0.9
3rd Quintile 6.1 2.6 3.5 4.4 3.5
4th Quintile 1.8 4.4 6.1 2.6 5.3
5th Quintile 1.8 1.8 2.6 6.1 7.0
Level-on-Lag vs. Arellano-Bond
Sum Diagonal ≈ 36.8% Level-on-Lag Model
1st Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile 5th Quintile
Arellano-
Bond
Model
1st Quintile 7.9 3.5 5.3 1.8 1.8
2nd Quintile 6.1 7.0 5.3 1.8 0
3rd Quintile 5.3 3.5 5.3 4.4 1.8
4th Quintile 0.9 4.4 3.5 6.1 5.3
5th Quintile 0 1.8 0.9 6.1 10.5
Notes: Percent frequencies are displayed. Within each row, the column entry in which the median
observation occurs is in bold. The 1st quintile refers to the bottom 20 percent, while the 5th quintile
refers to the top 20 percent. Results in this table use control specification B for both models.
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Table 3.6. Relative Ranking of Schools, Compared Across Models, for Reading
Gain vs. Level-on-Lag
Sum Diagonal ≈ 41.2% Gain Model
1st Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile 5th Quintile
Level-on-
Lag
Model
1st Quintile 12.3 4.4 2.6 0.9 0
2nd Quintile 3.5 6.1 7.0 3.5 0
3rd Quintile 2.6 4.4 5.3 4.4 3.5
4th Quintile 1.8 3.5 2.6 7.0 5.3
5th Quintile 0 1.8 2.6 4.4 10.5
Gain vs. Arellano-Bond
Sum Diagonal ≈ 22.8% Gain Model
1st Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile 5th Quintile
Arellano-
Bond
Model
1st Quintile 3.5 2.6 6.1 3.5 4.4
2nd Quintile 7.0 5.3 2.6 2.6 2.6
3rd Quintile 4.4 4.4 3.5 6.1 1.8
4th Quintile 2.6 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4
5th Quintile 2.6 3.5 3.5 3.5 6.1
Level-on-Lag vs. Arellano-Bond
Sum Diagonal ≈ 35.1% Level-on-Lag Model
1st Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile 5th Quintile
Arellano-
Bond
Model
1st Quintile 7.0 6.1 2.6 2.6 1.8
2nd Quintile 7.0 6.1 4.4 2.6 0
3rd Quintile 1.8 5.3 5.3 7 0.9
4th Quintile 3.5 1.8 4.4 5.3 5.3
5th Quintile 0.9 0.9 3.5 2.6 11.4
Notes: Percent frequencies are displayed. Within each row, the column entry in which the median
observation occurs is in bold. The 1st quintile refers to the bottom 20 percent, while the 5th quintile
refers to the top 20 percent. Results in this table use control specification B for all models.
Table 3.7. Spearman Rank Correlations Between Value-Added and Level of Test Score
Math Reading
Gain LevLag ABond Gain LevLag ABond
Control A -0.043 0.732 0.628 Control A 0.075 0.856 0.680
Control B -0.013 0.530 0.427 Control B 0.107 0.706 0.454
Control C 0.632 0.764 0.203 Control C 0.645 0.785 0.605
Notes: Covariates change for the value-added models, but not for the levels model. The
levels model includes only school, year, and grade fixed effects, with no additional covariates
throughout.
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Figure 3.1. Histograms of Value-Added Coefficients, Math
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Figure 3.2. Histograms of Value-Added Coefficients, Reading
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Figure 3.3. Scatterplots of Value-Added Coefficients, Math
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Figure 3.4. Scatterplots of Value-Added Coefficients, Reading
Appendix A
Combined Appendix
A.1 Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1.1 Index Score
To help protect student anonymity, the UCOP dataset does not report students’
exact high school GPA or SAT scores, but instead reports them within a bin range.
Unfortunately, these bins are somewhat coarser than one would like to fully control
for academic achievement. Raw high school GPA is reported in bins of 0.25, while
SAT score is reported in bins of 50 points by category (except the top bin, which goes
700–800).
Much of this problem can ultimately be resolved using an additional measure of
student achievement, known as the Index score. Index score is a composite measure of
student achievement, computed by UCOP as a linear combination of high school GPA
and SAT scores. Unlike the individual components, this Index score is recorded precisely
in the data. It is thus able to detect fine differences in achievement that are invisible to
the GPA and SAT bins. Index score thus serves as the primary academic control in all
regressions, and is included using a cubic polynomial for flexibility.
Figure A1 shows a histogram of Index score among applicants from California
public high schools.
119
120
Figure A1. Histogram of Index Score
Index score has a maximum value of 1000, with up to 400 points coming from
high school GPA, and 300 points each from SATI Math and Verbal scores. Regressing
Index score on continuous approximations (provided by UCOP) of high school GPA and
SAT scores, the approximate formula is:
Index Score ≈ −165 + 90 · HSGPA + 0.48 · SAT Math + 0.48 · SAT Verbal. (A1)
One point to keep in mind, when using this measure, is that not all combinations
that achieve the same Index score are necessarily equally effective for admissions. (In
practice, most UC campuses seem to prefer students with higher GPA and lower SAT
score than vice versa.) To help address this issue, all regressions include dummies for
the bin value of high school GPA and SAT score (by category), along with the cubic
polynomial of Index score.
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A.1.2 Standard Errors
Due to various similarities in experience between students of the same high school,
intuitively one wishes to group error terms at the high school level. This clustering cannot
be achieved, however, since individual high schools are not indicated in the data. Error
terms are instead clustered by student in pooled regressions, and currently unclustered
for individual campuses. While a possible alternative is to cluster by API decile, that
choice is also inappropriate, as ten deciles is too few to invoke asymptotic properties, and
also encounters challenges using cluster-bootstrap techniques (Cameron, Gelbach and
Miller, 2008).
This section instead computes the degree of within-cluster error correlation
needed to make results in Table 3 insignificant based on the Moulton (1986) factor. For
the case of simple regression, the OLS standard error should be inflated by a factor of√
1 + ρxρu(var(Ng)/N¯g + N¯g − 1) (A2)
where ρx denotes within-cluster correlation of x, ρu denotes within-cluster error corre-
lation, Ng is the number of observations in cluster g, and N¯g is the average cluster size.
While this result is inexact with more than one regressor, it can still provide a reasonable
approximation (Moulton, 1990). Further, although this result is for OLS, here the z
statistics on average marginal effects obtained using a probit regression are very similar
to those obtained under OLS (see Table A4 for OLS results).
Treating individual high schools as clusters, ρx ≈ 1, as except for high schools
right near decile cutoffs, which may finish above or below the cutoff in a given year, API
decile is mostly stable from year-to-year. Next, based on supplemental tabulations from
UCOP, a total of 1,276 California public high schools had at least one student applying
to UC colleges between 2001–2006. Assuming this count also holds true for individual
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campuses, and that the proportional composition by high school is also constant across
campuses, one can plug in approximate values of N¯g and var(Ng), and thereby compute
the minimum value of ρu that renders results insignificant.
For example, the average marginal effect for UC Berkeley has a z statistic of
−21.60 in Table 3. Significance at the 5% level disappears if standard errors are un-
derstated 11.02 times relative to the truth. Under the stated assumptions, UC Berkeley
has an average cluster size of 116.33 with a variance of 24,010.8. Significance at the
5% level disappears if
√
1 + ρu(24, 010.8/116.33 + 116.33− 1) ≥ 11.02. This occurs
when ρu ≥ 0.374. That is, within-high school error correlation of at least 0.374 renders
results insignificant for UC Berkeley in Table 3.
Table A1 shows the required value of ρu for each campus. As seen, even a small
degree of within-high school error correlation makes results insignificant at UC Irvine
and UC Riverside. However, these are both campuses where the average marginal effect
is currently estimated to be positive. Loss of significance at these campuses does not
substantively affect results. For campuses where the estimated average marginal effect is
negative, ρu needs to be at least 0.276 before significance disappears.
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Table A2. Descriptive Statistics, Alternate View
Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max
API Decile 320,721 6.99 2.84 1 10
Eligibility in the Local Context 320,721 0.19 0.39 0 1
Index Score 320,443 690 109 67 1000
Raw High School GPAa 318,208 3.38 0.47 2.50 3.87
SATI Mathb 315,420 597 96 400 724
SATI Verbalb 315,415 564 98 400 724
SATII Writingb 309,509 569 100 400 724
SATII Third Subject Scoreb 290,579 606 105 400 724
Number of AP Courses (in Semesters) 313,749 7.20 5.31 0 90
Parental Income Percentilec 255,275 68.4 29.1 6.1 96.3
Parental Education Percentiled 306,896 65.4 30.4 2.3 93.7
White 320,721 0.35 0.48 0 1
Asian 320,721 0.35 0.48 0 1
Underrepresented Minority 320,721 0.23 0.42 0 1
Other/Unknown Race 320,721 0.08 0.26 0 1
Science Major 320,391 0.32 0.47 0 1
Social Science Major 320,391 0.15 0.36 0 1
Other Major 320,391 0.53 0.50 0 1
Mean SAT of Applied Campuses 320,391 1205 39 1069 1296
Applied to Berkeley 320,721 0.47 0.50 0 1
Applied to Davis 320,721 0.44 0.50 0 1
Applied to Irvine 320,721 0.51 0.50 0 1
Applied to Los Angeles 320,721 0.58 0.49 0 1
Applied to Riverside 320,721 0.36 0.48 0 1
Applied to San Diego 320,721 0.58 0.49 0 1
Applied to Santa Barbara 320,721 0.51 0.50 0 1
Applied to Santa Cruz 320,721 0.33 0.47 0 1
Cumulative College GPAe 154,006 2.99 0.60 1.05 3.95
Notes: This table uses continuous approximations, provided by UCOP, for variables in bins.
Values are typically coded at bin midpoints, with some exceptions for top and bottom end
bins.
a – Recorded in bins of 0.00-2.99; 3.00-3.24; 3.25-3.49; 3.50-3.74; 3.75-4.00
b – Recorded in bins of 200-449; 450-499; 500-549; 550-599; 600-649; 650-699; 700-800
c – Parental income is originally recorded in bins of $0-9,999; $10,000-19,999; $20,000-
29,999; ...; $90,000-99,999; and $100,000+ per year. These have been converted to per-
centiles using the 2000 U.S. Census.
d – Parental education is originally recorded in bins of no high school; some high school;
high school graduate; some college; 2-year college graduate; 4-year college graduate; and
postgraduate study. These have been converted to percentiles using the 2000 U.S. Census.
e – Recorded in bins of 0–1.09; 1.10–1.19; 1.20–1.29; ...; 3.90–4.00.
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Table A3. Selected Means by UC Campus
Applicants
API HS SATI Income Underrep.
Campus N Admit Attend Decile GPA Total ELC %-ile Minority
Berkeley 149,940 0.27 0.12 7.21 3.51 1217 0.26 68.4 0.20
Los Angeles 185,620 0.26 0.11 7.08 3.46 1194 0.24 67.3 0.22
San Diego 185,893 0.44 0.11 7.35 3.45 1197 0.22 70.0 0.18
Irvine 162,732 0.58 0.13 7.04 3.36 1157 0.19 66.3 0.21
Santa Barbara 163,773 0.54 0.11 7.30 3.36 1163 0.15 71.1 0.21
Davis 141,992 0.63 0.16 7.37 3.40 1173 0.17 70.8 0.17
Santa Cruz 105,203 0.79 0.14 7.27 3.28 1142 0.10 69.9 0.21
Riverside 116,222 0.88 0.15 6.64 3.22 1097 0.10 64.4 0.29
Admits
API HS SATI Income Underrep.
Campus N Admit Attend Decile GPA Total ELC %-ile Minority
Berkeley 39,964 1 0.45 7.23 3.80 1312 0.60 69.7 0.17
Los Angeles 49,031 1 0.42 7.29 3.75 1309 0.50 68.1 0.17
San Diego 81,451 1 0.25 7.38 3.72 1280 0.44 69.0 0.15
Irvine 94,017 1 0.22 7.38 3.58 1232 0.32 70.9 0.16
Santa Barbara 87,764 1 0.21 7.13 3.59 1220 0.26 70.6 0.20
Davis 88,138 1 0.26 7.36 3.58 1223 0.26 69.9 0.16
Santa Cruz 82,265 1 0.18 7.39 3.41 1169 0.12 71.4 0.19
Riverside 95,903 1 0.18 6.84 3.30 1120 0.11 66.4 0.26
Attending Students
API HS SATI Income Underrep.
Campus N Admit Attend Decile GPA Total ELC %-ile Minority
Berkeley 17,966 1 1 7.18 3.77 1289 0.53 68.6 0.16
Los Angeles 20,829 1 1 7.04 3.69 1267 0.41 65.4 0.18
San Diego 20,559 1 1 7.39 3.64 1245 0.32 67.4 0.13
Irvine 20,868 1 1 7.59 3.43 1191 0.17 72.6 0.14
Santa Barbara 18,815 1 1 6.95 3.47 1171 0.15 72.1 0.24
Davis 23,320 1 1 7.11 3.46 1164 0.17 66.8 0.15
Santa Cruz 14,493 1 1 7.40 3.25 1139 0.05 73.1 0.19
Riverside 17,679 1 1 6.34 3.12 1067 0.08 62.6 0.32
Notes: N reports the total number of applicants, admits, or attending students from California public
high schools between 2001 and 2006. Individual students appear once at each campus applied or
admitted.
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A.2 Appendix to Chapter 2
Table A7. The Relationship Between Winning a Lottery and Attrition
Magnet VEEP Choice Pooled
On Track in Grade 9 0.007 -0.015 0.000 -0.001
(0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.007)
Passed Exit Exam in Grade 10 0.002 -0.006 -0.013 -0.004
(0.009) (0.015) (0.011) (0.007)
% Days Attended in Grade 12 -0.010 -0.016 -0.004 -0.010
(0.015) (0.024) (0.020) (0.011)
Grade 12 Citizenship Grade -0.001 -0.004 -0.016 -0.006
(0.015) (0.022) (0.019) (0.011)
GPA in Grade 12 -0.004 -0.008 -0.011 -0.007
(0.016) (0.021) (0.019) (0.011)
Graduated on Time 0.002 -0.015 0.007 -0.002
(0.009) (0.020) (0.016) (0.008)
# Years Postsecondary 1 Year after Graduation -0.021 -0.025 0.005 -0.015
(0.012) (0.017) (0.016) (0.008)
# Years in 2-Year College 1 Year after Graduation -0.021 -0.025 0.005 -0.015
(0.012) (0.017) (0.016) (0.008)
# Years in 4-Year College 1 Year after Graduation -0.021 -0.025 0.005 -0.015
(0.012) (0.017) (0.016) (0.008)
# Years Postsecondary 4 Years after Graduation -0.021 -0.025 0.005 -0.015
(0.012) (0.017) (0.016) (0.008)
# Years in 2-Year College 4 Years after Graduation -0.021 -0.025 0.005 -0.015
(0.012) (0.017) (0.016) (0.008)
# Years in 4-Year College 4 Years after Graduation -0.021 -0.025 0.005 -0.015
(0.012) (0.017) (0.016) (0.008)
Associate’s or Other 2-Year College Certification
4 Years after Graduation
-0.029* -0.021 -0.004 -0.020*
(0.013) (0.017) (0.016) (0.009)
Associate’s or Other 2-Year College Certification
5 Years after Graduation
-0.027* -0.015 -0.012 -0.020*
(0.013) (0.017) (0.014) (0.008)
Associate’s or Other 2-Year College Certification
6 Years after Graduation
-0.023 -0.014 -0.007 -0.016*
(0.013) (0.017) (0.013) (0.008)
Bachelor’s Degree 4 Years after Graduation -0.024 -0.019 -0.000 -0.016
(0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.009)
Bachelor’s Degree 5 Years after Graduation -0.022 -0.013 -0.007 -0.016
(0.013) (0.017) (0.012) (0.008)
Bachelor’s Degree 6 Years after Graduation -0.019 -0.012 -0.003 -0.013
(0.012) (0.017) (0.012) (0.008)
Notes: For each outcome of interest, an indicator for “missing” is used as the outcome and regressed
on a dummy for winning the lottery plus lottery fixed effects. This table reports the coefficients
on ‘win lottery’ from these regressions, along with their standard errors. Positive significant results
indicate that lottery winners have greater attrition for the outcome of interest, while negative results
indicate that lottery losers have greater attrition. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered
by lottery. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
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Table A11. Intent to Treat Estimates on Postsecondary Graduation Outcomes with 2-Year
and 4-Year Degrees Combined
(1) (2) (3)
Bachelor’s or Bachelor’s or Bachelor’s or
Associate’s or Associate’s or Associate’s or
Other 2-Year Other 2-Year Other 2-Year
College Cert. College Cert. College Cert.
4 Years After 5 Years After 6 Years After
HS Graduation HS Graduation HS Graduation
Magnet Win 0.0138 -0.00243 -0.0337
(0.0142) (0.0159) (0.0239)
VEEP Win 0.0370** 0.0218 0.0226
(0.0110) (0.0180) (0.0265)
Choice Win -0.0288 0.00704 0.0180
(0.0167) (0.0247) (0.0291)
Pooled Win 0.00992 0.00601 -0.00546
(0.00927) (0.0107) (0.0155)
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by lottery. ** p<0.01,
* p<0.05.
A.3 Appendix to Chapter 3
A.3.1 Arellano-Bond Estimation
Roodman (2009) provides a good overview of dynamic panel bias and techniques
that have developed to address this issue. We explain the basics below, and then provide
additional details about how we estimate regressions using an Arellano and Bond (1991)
estimator.
Dynamic panel bias arises in equations that feature both fixed effects and lagged
dependent variables as regressors (Nickell, 1981). A simple such equation may take the
form
yit = ρ
∗yi,t−1 + x′itβ
∗ + µi + uit, (A3)
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where µi is an unobserved heterogeneity factor for person i, and ∗it = µi + uit is a
composite error term.
The key issue is that the lagged dependent variable, yi,t−1 is mechanically an
endogenous variable. If Equation A3 is estimated using a conventional fixed effects
estimator, any unmodeled shocks affect the estimated value of the fixed effect µi, creating
a negative correlation between yi,t−1 and ∗it, and returning downward-biased estimates
of ρ∗. This problem is worse the smaller is T : the number of periods in the panel.
(It is worth remembering that in our context the key interest is not on the au-
toregressive parameter, ρ, but on the school value-added coefficients. Nevertheless,
dynamic panel bias remains a possible concern, since biased estimates of ρ also affect
the corresponding school value-added coefficients.)
Arellano and Bond (1991) propose a popular method to address dynamic panel
bias by using using a first difference instrumental variables (FDIV) procedure. Equation
A3 is transformed into a first-differenced version:
∆yit = ρ
∗∆yi,t−1 + ∆x′itβ
∗ + ∆uit (A4)
which no longer contains the person fixed effect, µi. Under appropriate conditions —
most notably an assumption about no serial correlation in uit — this equation can be
consistently estimated using instrumental variables, with lagged values of regressors
serving as the instruments.
Which lags are valid to use depend on what variables are exogenous, endogenous,
or predetermined. Exogenous variables are assumed to be uncorrelated with past, present,
and future disturbances. First differences of these variables are used as instruments in
Equation A4. Predetermined variables are assumed to be uncorrelated with present and
future disturbances, but may be correlated with past disturbances. Lagged values of one
period or more of these variables are used as instruments in Equation A4. Endogenous
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variables are possibly correlated with both present and past disturbances. Lagged values
of two periods or more of these variables are used as instruments in Equation A4.
Table A12 shows how we classify variable in the full specification of the Arellano-
Bond model in our paper.
Table A12. Variable Classification in Arellano-Bond Regressions
Variable Classification Lags Used
Lagged Test Score Sigs,t−1 Predetermined 1–2
School Dummies Endogenous 2–3
Grade Dummies Predetermined 1–2
Year Dummies Exogenous N/A
Female Dummy Exogenous N/A
Race Dummies Exogenous N/A
Parent Ed Dummies Predetermined 1–2
English Learner Status† Predetermined 1–2
Fluent English Proficient Status† Predetermined 1–2
Special Education Status† Predetermined 1–2
% Free or Reduced Price Lunch Predetermined 1–2
% African-American Predetermined 1–2
% Hispanic Predetermined 1–2
% Asian/Pacific Islander Predetermined 1–2
% Native American Predetermined 1–2
% English Learner† Predetermined 1–2
% Fluent English Proficient† Predetermined 1–2
Notes: Table reports the classification of variables in the full specification
of the Arellano-Bond model. Exogenous variables are assumed to be
uncorrelated with past, present, and future errors. Predetermined variables
are assumed to be uncorrelated with present and future errors, but possibly
correlated with past errors. Endogenous variables may be correlated with
either present or past errors. Variables marked with dagger (†) are based
on students’ status in their first appearance in the district.
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Table A13. Spearman Rank Correlations of Shrunk Value-Added Coefficients Across
Control Specifications
Gain Model
Math Reading
Control A Control B Control C Control A Control B Control C
Control A 1 Control A 1
Control B 0.993 1 Control B 0.995 1
Control C 0.490 0.540 1 Control C 0.568 0.589 1
Level-on-Lag Model
Math Reading
Control A Control B Control C Control A Control B Control C
Control A 1 Control A 1
Control B 0.937 1 Control B 0.947 1
Control C 0.889 0.770 1 Control C 0.916 0.857 1
Arellano-Bond Model
Math Reading
Control A Control B Control C Control A Control B Control C
Control A 1 Control A 1
Control B 0.811 1 Control B 0.832 1
Control C 0.524 0.790 1 Control C 0.748 0.825 1
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Table A14. Spearmank Rank Correlations of Shrunk Value-Added Coefficients Across
Model Classes
Control Specification A
Math Reading
Gain LevLag ABond Gain LevLag ABond
Gain 1 Gain 1
LevLag 0.600 1 LevLag 0.530 1
ABond 0.137 0.634 1 ABond 0.099 0.654 1
Control Specification B
Math Reading
Gain LevLag ABond Gain LevLag ABond
Gain 1 Gain 1
LevLag 0.761 1 LevLag 0.683 1
ABond 0.348 0.620 1 ABond 0.194 0.594 1
Control Specification C
Math Reading
Gain LevLag ABond Gain LevLag ABond
Gain 1 Gain 1
LevLag 0.922 1 LevLag 0.929 1
ABond 0.202 0.326 1 ABond 0.420 0.598 1
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Table A15. Relative Ranking of Schools Using Shrunk Estimates, Compared Across
Models, for Math
Gain vs. Level-on-Lag
Sum Diagonal ≈ 46.5% Gain Model
1st Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile 5th Quintile
Level-on-
Lag
Model
1st Quintile 13.2 5.3 0.9 0.9 0
2nd Quintile 4.4 7.9 5.3 1.8 0.9
3rd Quintile 1.8 4.4 5.3 7.9 0.9
4th Quintile 0 1.8 8.8 6.1 3.5
5th Quintile 0.9 0.9 0 3.5 14.0
Gain vs. Arellano-Bond
Sum Diagonal ≈ 25.4% Gain Model
1st Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile 5th Quintile
Arellano-
Bond
Model
1st Quintile 4.4 5.3 4.4 4.4 1.8
2nd Quintile 7.0 6.1 3.5 3.5 0
3rd Quintile 5.3 2.6 3.5 3.5 5.3
4th Quintile 1.8 4.4 6.1 3.5 4.4
5th Quintile 1.8 1.8 2.6 5.3 7.9
Level-on-Lag vs. Arellano-Bond
Sum Diagonal ≈ 37.8% Level-on-Lag Model
1st Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile 5th Quintile
Arellano-
Bond
Model
1st Quintile 7.9 5.3 5.3 0.9 0.9
2nd Quintile 7.0 5.3 5.3 2.6 0
3rd Quintile 4.4 3.5 5.3 4.4 2.6
4th Quintile 0.9 4.4 4.4 7.0 3.5
5th Quintile 0 1.8 0 5.3 12.3
Notes: Percent frequencies are displayed. Within each row, the column entry in which the median
observation occurs is in bold. The 1st quintile refers to the bottom 20 percent, while the 5th quintile
refers to the top 20 percent. Results in this table use control specification B for all models.
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Table A16. Relative Ranking of Schools Using Shrunk Estimates, Compared Across
Models, for Reading
Gain vs. Level-on-Lag
Sum Diagonal ≈ 41.2% Gain Model
1st Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile 5th Quintile
Level-on-
Lag
Model
1st Quintile 12.3 4.4 2.6 0.9 0
2nd Quintile 3.5 6.1 7.0 3.5 0
3rd Quintile 2.6 4.4 5.3 4.4 3.5
4th Quintile 1.8 3.5 2.6 7.0 5.3
5th Quintile 0 1.8 2.6 4.4 10.5
Gain vs. Arellano-Bond
Sum Diagonal ≈ 21.1% Gain Model
1st Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile 5th Quintile
Arellano-
Bond
Model
1st Quintile 4.4 2.6 6.1 3.5 3.5
2nd Quintile 7.0 5.3 3.5 0.9 3.5
3rd Quintile 2.6 4.4 3.5 7.9 1.8
4th Quintile 4.4 4.4 3.5 2.6 5.3
5th Quintile 1.8 3.5 3.5 5.3 5.3
Level-on-Lag vs. Arellano-Bond
Sum Diagonal ≈ 38.6% Level-on-Lag Model
1st Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile 5th Quintile
Arellano-
Bond
Model
1st Quintile 8.8 6.1 2.6 1.8 0.9
2nd Quintile 4.4 7.0 4.4 3.5 0.9
3rd Quintile 4.4 4.4 4.4 5.3 1.8
4th Quintile 2.6 2.6 5.3 6.1 3.5
5th Quintile 0 0 3.5 3.5 12.3
Notes: Percent frequencies are displayed. Within each row, the column entry in which the median
observation occurs is in bold. The 1st quintile refers to the bottom 20 percent, while the 5th quintile
refers to the top 20 percent. Results in this table use control specification B for all models.
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Table A17. Spearman Rank Correlations Between Shrunk Value-Added and Level of
Test Score
Math Reading
Gain LevLag ABond Gain LevLag ABond
Control A -0.043 0.731 0.680 Control A 0.074 0.855 0.720
Control B -0.012 0.530 0.464 Control B 0.106 0.706 0.505
Control C 0.655 0.793 0.224 Control C 0.657 0.789 0.628
Notes: Covariates change for the value-added models, but not for the levels model. The
levels model includes only school, year, and grade fixed effects, with no additional covari-
ates throughout. Shrinkage has been applied to the value-added coefficients, but not the
coefficients of the levels model.
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Figure A2. Scatterplots of Shrunk Value-Added Coefficients, Math
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Figure A3. Scatterplots of Shrunk Value-Added Coefficients, Reading
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